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THE ETHICS OF CAUSE LAWYERING: AN
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS
MARGARETH ETIENNE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Jose Orlando Lopez retained a prominent criminal defense
attorney, Barry Tarlow, to represent him on serious narcotics charges.' Mr.
Tarlow's understanding with his client was that Tarlow would "vigorously
defend and try" the case but that he would not negotiate on Lopez's behalf
if Lopez decided to turn over State's evidence and become an informant in
exchange for a reduced sentence. For moral and ethical reasons, it was
Tarlow's general policy "not to represent clients in negotiations with the
government concerning cooperation." (Indeed, later in the case when
Lopez decided to enter into a cooperator's agreement with the prosecution,
Lopez sought to negotiate the deal on his own without the assistance of
counsel. These pro se plea negotiations ultimately failed). According to
Tarlow, such cooperation negotiations were "personally, morally and
ethically offensive" and he would no sooner represent a snitch than he
* Associate Professor and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar, University of Illinois
College of Law at Urbana-Champaign. A.B., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School. I am
grateful for the research grant provided by the Arnold 0. Beckman Award through the
University of Illinois Campus Research Board without which this study would not have been
possible. I would like to thank Patrick J. Keenan, Andrew Leipold, Anna-Maria Marshall,
Richard H. McAdams, Barbara A. Babcock as well as the participants of the law faculty
workshops at the University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, St. Louis
University, and the University of Notre Dame for their comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts of this paper. In addition, I thank Stacey Ballmes, Amy Tomaszewski, Lucille Kalnes,
and Matthew Hertko for their invaluable assistance. Finally, I also owe a special thanks to
the criminal defense attorneys who took the time to share their thoughts and experiences
with me, contributing greatly to the enrichment of this inquiry.
1 United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 989 F.2d 1032
(9th Cir. 1993), amended by 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
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would represent "Nazis or an Argentine general said to be responsible for
10,000 'disappearances."
2
Whatever one thinks of Tarlow's policy, this case highlights an
important truth. For Barry Tarlow and many other defense attorneys, the
practice of criminal defense is about much more than helping individual
clients achieve their individual goals. Criminal defense attorneys are often
motivated by an intricate set of moral and ideological principles that belie
their reputations as amoral (if not immoral) "hired guns" who, for the right
price, would do anything to get their guilty clients off.3  Some of the
collateral causes advanced by these attorneys are laudable while others are
not. But almost all of them raise ethical concerns that the rules of ethics
and professionalism are not well-equipped to resolve. This is a noteworthy
problem because cause-lawyering has played an important role in socio-
legal movements in this country.
The cause-motivated approach to lawyering contradicts the traditional
view of those in the legal profession as rights-enforcers or as neutral
advocates of their clients' interests.4 Weighing the virtue of neutrality in an
advocate versus that of activism, the ethics and professional responsibility
literature seems to embrace the former as the more appropriate of the two.
Lawyers are strongly advised to be zealous but neutral advocates of their
clients' interests.5 They also have a duty of loyalty to clients that may
prohibit them from representing clients in cases where the attorney feels the
pull of professional, personal, or political interests distinct from those of the
client.6
These conflicts raise significant ethical concerns for cause lawyers-
activist lawyers who use the law as a means of creating social change in
2 Gail D. Cox, Fighting and Flaunting It: The Criminal Defense Bar's Best Defense is
Barry Tarlow- Just Ask Him, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19, 1993, at 28.
3 For a more detailed description of the "hired gun" approach to lawyering, see William
Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 29 (1992).
4 See Austin Sarat, Between (the Presence oj) Violence and (the Possibility o]) Justice, in
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 318-19
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING]
(distinguishing between lawyers who are "hired guns" and use their skills with no sense of
accountability for the results and those who politicize their legal practice and use their skills
to seek justice).
5 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A lawyer must also
act... with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
6 See id R. 1.7(b) (prohibiting lawyers from undertaking representations in which there
is a conflict of interest with "another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer"); id R. 1.3 cmt. I ("A lawyer must ... act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client ... ").
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addition to a means of helping individual clients. These lawyers are known
by many names in the legal and sociological literature, including radical
lawyers, critical lawyers, public interest lawyers, poverty lawyers, socially
conscious lawyers, visionary lawyers, and so forth.7 The worry for the
cause lawyer is that the pursuit of her "cause" may at times conflict with the
client's interest. A lawyer's professionalism is measured in part by her
ability to keep her personal and political agendas apart from (and secondary
to) her clients' agendas. Accordingly, the repeated cautions against
conflicts of interest when representing clients8 suggest that lawyers ought to
be wary of non-client-centered goals in lawyering. Tarlow's particular
policy of not representing snitches is open to criticism on this ground,9 but
is merely one example of an overall approach to criminal defense lawyering
in which the attorney's moral and political values play centrally in her
advocacy decisions.
In this Article-the first to seriously evaluate whether criminal defense
lawyers are cause lawyers 1 -I consider several examples of cause
lawyering as described by defense lawyers during the course of forty
interviews. Through their discussions, I explore the types of values or
commitments that animate defense lawyers' approaches to the practice of
law and the impact of such "cause lawyering" on the criminal defendant. I
consider whether the cause lawyering approach in the criminal context is
compatible with ethical and professional rules, and argue that it should be.
Sometimes criminal defendants are better represented by defense attorneys
who are "cause lawyers" passionately seeking to advance their political and
moral visions through the representation of their clients than by attorneys
who have no overriding "cause" other than the representation of the
7 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra
note 4, at 33.
8 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. § 9 ("In the nature of law practice,
however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems
arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to
the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory
living.").
9 There may be other grounds for disagreement with Tarlow's approach. It is not fully
clear why Tarlow refuses to represent defendants who turn over state's evidence. Perhaps it
is simply that he finds the decision to cooperate with law enforcement against others morally
repulsive. It may also be that he refuses to participate in cooperation agreements as a
strategic stance against the practice of snitching, believing that snitching has deleterious
effects on the criminal justice system and the communities targeted by these cooperating
informants. Tarlow Would not be the first to adopt such a view. See Alexandra Natapoff,
Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CNN. L. REV. 645, 646-47
(2004).
10 See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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individual client. Ethical and professional norms should be more adaptive
to these instances.
This paper challenges the well-established view that neutrality (or at
least client-centrality) is the only ethical approach to lawyering. I provide
empirical evidence supporting the contention that in many instances the
cause lawyer's approach is not only defensible but preferable. My
conclusion provides no quarrel with the notion that the defendant's goals
should take priority over the attorney's personal or political goals. Rather, I
illustrate that the common formulation of the conflict-of-interest problem is
oversimplified and unrealistic for the many criminal defense lawyers who
are also cause lawyers. The real conflict lies not between the client and the
lawyer's political interests but rather between this client's interest and the
interests of other clients that better embody the attorney's larger moral or
political cause. 1 "Other clients" can be other current clients, other future
clients, or the class of criminal defendants generally. This conflict, one that
criminal defense attorneys and other cause lawyers face regularly, is the
focus of this paper.
The Article proceeds in four parts. In Parts I and II, I make the case
that many criminal defense attorneys are in fact cause lawyers-lawyers
who use their legal skills "to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client
service."' 12 Part I presents empirical evidence from a qualitative study of
forty criminal defense attorneys. Following a brief description of the
project design and methodology, I describe the attorneys' practices and
attitudes about criminal defending and the reasons they choose it. The
interview data from this qualitative study reveal that many defense
attorneys are motivated by a range of moral and political beliefs and that
they practice in a manner consistent with those beliefs. Part II provides a
brief review of the scholarly literature on cause or public interest lawyering
and its application to the criminal defense enterprise. Read together, Parts I
and II leave little doubt that although criminal defense attorneys represent,
almost by definition, individual clients in individual and unrelated cases,
11 Some cause lawyers are quick to discount these competing interests of individual
clients as a real conflict and argue that priority is always given to the instant client. See, e.g.,
Susan Sterett, Caring About Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain, in CAUSE
LAWYERING, supra note 4, at 293, 306 (citing a British immigration lawyer's explanation
that "[o]ne's duty as a lawyer is to one's client, not to the mass of other potential clients. So
if there's a point you can get a result on your client on you have to pursue it. You can't say I
won't take this point because it might be worse for other people unless the client wants to
adopt altruistic self-sacrifice as part of his or her instructions to you.").
12 Id.; see also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN:
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3 (2004). The goals pursued by cause
lawyers can be social, cultural, political, economic, or legal. Id.
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many are cause lawyers for whom law practice is "a deeply moral and
political activity."' 3 As Scheingold and Sarat put it in their recent book on
cause lawyers, these are lawyers who "have something to believe in and
bring their beliefs to work in their work lives."
14
Parts III and IV consider the ramifications of having cause lawyers
practicing criminal defense. In Part III, the heart of this paper, I consider
the types of conflicts encountered by criminal defense attorneys precisely
because they are working on behalf of causes in addition to working on
behalf of individual clients. The focus of this section is on conflicts
encountered by criminal defense lawyers when the goals that they "believe
in" are different and possibly (though not necessarily) incompatible with
the goals of their clients. I explore in detail three conflicts mentioned
repeatedly by the respondent attorneys: their decisions regarding whether to
file Anders briefs informing the court that the defendant has no viable
issues, the use of collective action by attorneys to challenge unfavorable
Government policies, and decisions to forego making certain arguments on
behalf of particular clients. Part IV considers the question of whether
criminal defendants are better off with cause lawyers or with non-partisan
attorneys operating under the conventional approach of neutrality. I
conclude that contrary to conventional beliefs, defendants are not always
better off when represented by criminal defense lawyers guided only by the
formal dictates of the professional responsibility and ethics rules. I argue
that the formalistic approach to conflicts of interest embodied by the ethical
and professional rules fails to account for the realities of cause lawyering in
general and criminal defense lawyering in particular. While the paper
ultimately raises more questions than it can answer given the limited data,
its purpose is to contribute to an important dialogue regarding the ethical
regulation of cause lawyers.
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL DEFENDERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS
This project emanates from an empirical study involving lengthy
interviews of forty criminal defense attorneys. An earlier component of this
study had as its central aim the exploration of how the federal sentencing
guidelines affect these lawyer's perceived abilities to be successful
advocates. 15 Despite my own experience as a criminal defense attorney, I
13 SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 2.
14 Id.
15 Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REv. 425, 430 (2004) (discussing "the extent
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quickly learned that in constructing my inquiry, I had made certain
assumptions about what it means to be a successful advocate and that these
assumptions were not necessarily shared by many of the attorneys being
interviewed. For many of the lawyers with whom I spoke, the requirements
set forth by the ethics rules (that lawyers zealously pursue their individual
clients' interests and objectives) were viewed as baseline or minimum
requirements.1 6 Many of these lawyers had goals and motivations that were
distinct from their client's immediate objectives. My interest is in these
extra-curricular commitments and their effect on the enterprise of criminal
defense lawyering.
Understanding these lawyers' motivations, to the extent we can ever
understand anyone's motivations to do anything, helps to gain purchase on
the question of whether criminal defense lawyers ought to be included
within the category of "cause lawyers." After all, that which distinguishes
cause lawyers from conventional lawyers is their intent and motivation to
pursue social change. 17  Although cause lawyers differ widely in their
principles, ideologies, work settings and strategies, the essential and
distinguishing feature that binds them is that they are drawn and motivated
by moral and political commitments.'8 To classify a group of lawyers as
cause lawyers, one must begin by understanding what motivates them and
what they believe themselves to be about. In the case of criminal defense
lawyers, what are their motivations?
The issue of motivation in lawyering has been only marginally
explored. Yet, among the questions asked by scholars who study cause
lawyering, the most intriguing have to do with the issue of motivation. As
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow asks, what motivates a lawyer to
undertake work that is often poorly compensated and that may involve
personal, physical, economic, and status sacrifices in order to seek greater
social justice? 9 She laments that very little of the writing done on cause
to which criminal defense lawyers perceive that their advocacy decisions are influenced by
the acceptance of responsibility determinations or other provisions of the Guidelines").
16 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A lawyer must... act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client .. "); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not intentionally... [flail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and
the Disciplinary Rules."); see also id. EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and
to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.").
17 SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 3 ("Cause lawyering is associated with both
intent and behavior. Serving a cause by accident does not, in our judgment, qualify as cause
lawyering.").
18 Id. at 4.
19 Id. at 37.
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lawyering expressly considers the political, experiential, and psychological
roots of its motivations.2°
Even more under-examined are the motives of criminal defense
lawyers and how these motives impact the way in which they do their jobs.
An empirical examination of this small sample of criminal defense lawyers
provides an illustrative though non-exhaustive list of some of the
motivations that inspire and guide lawyers to seek social justice in the field
of criminal law and policy. The interview data from this study reveal a
wide range of motives, as mixed and varied as the lawyers themselves.
From this range of motives, several useful categories emerge: ideological
motives, personality-based motives, experiential motives, ambition-oriented
motives, and motives based on group identity. While the causes for which
criminal defense lawyers labor are as varied and mixed as the attorneys
themselves, there are nonetheless some glaring commonalities revealed in
the interviews of the defense attorneys. In the section that follows I
describe the design and results of the empirical study.
21
A. EMPIRICAL STUDY
1. Data and Project Design
The data for this study is derived from in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with forty criminal defense attorneys who practice mostly or
exclusively in federal court. The forty attorneys are from one of two large
and demographically diverse federal districts-in two different regions of
the country 22 -and comprise a mix of public defenders and private
attorneys. Prior to each interview, the lawyers were told that neither their
names nor the jurisdictions in which they practice would be revealed in the
study. This level of anonymity was intended to increase the responsiveness
and comfort level of the subjects. Each attorney interviewed was asked to
fill out a short questionnaire prior to the interview. The interviews, lasting
approximately sixty to ninety minutes each, explored the subjects'
perceptions of themselves as advocates and the factors that they felt
influenced their zealous representation of clients. Each interview was
audio-taped, transcribed, and coded.23 While the interviews spanned
20 id.
21 Some of the description of the study has been borrowed from an earlier Article on the
federal sentencing guidelines involving the same subjects. See Etienne, supra note 15, at
436-41.
22 I have omitted the specific jurisdictions in order to help preserve the anonymity of the
respondent attorneys as well as the judges and prosecutors they mentioned.
23 See Figure 1.
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various topics, each respondent was interviewed at some length about their
motivations for doing the work they do. Some of the questions asked in this
vein are listed below in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Sample Interview Questions
How would you characterize the goals of your job?
How do you determine what is the best result in any given case?
What are the kinds of things that the client gets to decide or that you
decide and not the client? Are there such things?
How much control would you say that you have over how your cases
develop? Why?
Do you think that public defenders face different challenges than private
attorneys from prosecutors, judges, or their clients?
To what extent are you ever in the position of having to worry about your
reputation and credibility?
To what extent do your colleagues or other members of your defense bar
iiifluence what you think is appropriate for you to do as an advocate?
Is there a particular culture in this office as far as advocacy issues?
Since you've started defending, has the nature of the job changed? How
has it changed?
Is there anything about your background or training or values that you
think significantly informs what kind of lawyer you are?
Why do you do this job?
Is there anything I haven't asked that maybe I should have asked? Any
aspects of the work that you think bears on your ability to be an effective
lawyer?
The lawyers for the study were identified in "snowball ' 2 4 fashion,
starting initially with the federal public defender offices in each selected
jurisdiction. Each of the two defender offices I visited employs fifteen to
24 Using a "snowball" or "chain" is one of several accepted methods of obtaining a
reliable subject sample in qualitative research. It involves selecting an initial group of
participants who help identify additional participants. Snowballing allows the researcher to
"identifly] cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are
information-rich." MATTHEW B. MILES & MICHAEL A. HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA
ANALYSIS: A SOURCEBOOK OF NEW METHODS 28 (2d ed. 1994).
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twenty attorneys.25 I contacted each attorney in the public defender offices
by electronic mail or telephone seeking an interview. From these attorneys,
I obtained a response rate of approximately seventy percent.26 I began by
interviewing all the attorneys who responded, with the exception of those
who worked exclusively on appeals or habeas corpus cases. I asked each
respondent for the names of other criminal defense attorneys in that
jurisdiction who might be willing to be interviewed. I maintained a list of
lawyers whose names were mentioned by more than one respondent. I
contacted these individuals, often mentioning the lawyers who referred me,
and obtained positive responses from approximately thirty percent of the
snowballed subjects.
2. Respondent Demographics
Of the forty respondents interviewed in the study, approximately half
were public defenders and half were private attorneys. The lawyers ranged
in experience and background. Most of the lawyers interviewed have been
practicing law between six and twenty-five years. Three of the respondents
have been practicing in federal court for five or fewer years and seven for
more than twenty years. A number of the lawyers had previously worked in
law firms or government organizations doing civil or other non-criminal
work, but most of them had done only criminal defense work during their
27 2careers. Three practiced for short stints as prosecutors.28 Based on the
questionnaires filled out by respondents themselves, the group included
fourteen female, twenty-six male, twenty-eight White or Caucasian, seven
Black or African-American, three Hispanic, Latina/o or Mexican, and two
Asian or Indian. They ranged in age from twenty-five to sixty-three 29 and
attended reputable law schools all over the country. I obtained
demographic information by having each attorney complete a short
questionnaire prior to beginning the interview.30 The questionnaire form
25 At the time of the study, one federal defender office employed nineteen attorneys and
the other employed sixteen attorneys. The private attorneys interviewed were either self-
employed or worked in small firms. Although a significant portion of the private attorney's
clients were privately retained, almost all the attorneys also handled court-appointed cases.
26 In approaching the lawyers, I told them very generally that I was conducting a study
on the factors that influence defense attorney advocacy. Most of the attorneys agreed to
meet with me but there were several whose schedules did not coincide with mine. Attorneys
who declined to participate up front also cited trials, vacations, or other scheduling conflicts.
27 See Figure 3.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 In addition to the interviews, each lawyer filled out a one page questionnaire. All
questionnaires, as well as the transcripts from the interviews, are on file with the author.
12032005]
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appears below in Figure 2. Some of the information from the preliminary




Regulating Criminal Defense Attorneys
Preliminary Questionnaire
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me for an
interview.
Please fill out this preliminary information below prior to our interview.




Number of years practicing law
Law School
Number of years as a defense attorney
Number of years as a prosecutor
How would you characterize the goals of your job as a defense attorney?
Thanks for your time.
31 See Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Questionnaire Results
# Gender Race Age - Years in Years Years Private
Optional Law Defense Prosecuting Attorney/
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Figure 3 (continued)
Questionnaire Results
# Gender Race Age - Years in Years Years Private
Optional Law Defense Prosecuting Attorney/
Practice Attorney Attorney Public
Defender
29 Male Indian Blank 15 12 0 Public
Sub-
continent
30 Male White 28 1 2 1 ' 0 Private
31 Male White/ 43 13 13 0 Public
Hispanic
32 Male White 52 27 27 blank Private
33 Male White 43 18 18 0 Public
34 Female White 32 6 4 0 Public
35 Male White 48 23 2 23 /2 0 Private
36 Male White 43 18 18 0 Private
37 Male White 51 26 16 10 Private
38 Male White 57 31 27 4 Private
39 Male White 63 34 30 0 Private
40 Female White 54 23 20 0 Private
The sample of lawyers in
representative of the federal
this study is not designed to be statistically
defense bar. As with most qualitative
empirical studies,32 my goal was not to conduct a randomized survey but to
obtain a nuanced understanding of defense lawyers' motivations for doing
32 Although this methodology is used predominantly by sociologists, similar studies have
appeared in other legal journals. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role
in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (1975) (explaining that the usefulness of
qualitative studies lies not in obtaining a scientific measure of a problem but in helping to
"guide analysis and to permit an evaluation of the inherency of the problems"); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 52 & n.15
(1968) (describing the study as "legal journalism" with particular analytic utilities rather than
a scientific survey); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAW & Soc'y REv. 275, 278-79 (2001) (reporting that his qualitative
study, consisting of interviews of thirty-nine attorneys, was conducted with the goal of in-
depth exploration of case selection, management, and settlement strategies rather than arrival
at a quantitative measure of specific variables); Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 373, 421
(1999) (explaining that the small sample studied-twenty nuisance cases-is useful in
generalizing about the types of problems encountered if not in measuring the extent of the
problem).
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the work they do. Interviews play a critical role in qualitative empirical
studies because they provide nuances and explanations that are difficult to
obtain from quantitative or statistical analysis.33 I expect that this study will
broaden our understanding of cause lawyers in general and our sense of the
cause for which criminal defense attorneys labor.
3. Preliminary Findings
As noted above, data were in the form of semi-structured interviews.
The interviews focused on sentencing practices and defense attorney
advocacy in the context of sentencing. As the attorneys explained their
practices and strategies as advocates, they revealed many of the underlying
values that animate their decisions. After gathering the interview data, I
combed the transcripts to identify and categorize the factors they said
motivated their conduct. Attorneys explained that they were motivated by:
(1) their desire to achieve the "best result" for clients; (2) their interest in
securing procedural fairness-as opposed to specific results-for clients;
(3) their optimistic worldview about human nature; 34 (4) their belief in
giving others the benefit of the doubt; (5) their commitment to equal justice
for the poor, minorities, and the disadvantaged; (6) their "social worker"
sensibilities; (7) their opposition to sentencing and prison policies and their
desire to fight government overreaching and law enforcement corruption;
(8) their respect for and desire to be respected by their colleagues in the
defense bar; (9) their belief in the adversarial justice system; (10) the
excitement of and opportunity for first-hand criminal litigation; (11) their
feelings of identification with their clients; and (12) the financial
compensation.
From these twelve broad categories, I identified those that relate to
cause lawyering. The result was six more specific categories of motives:
(1) the goal of securing fairness or procedural rights for those accused of
crimes; (2) the desire to effectuate broader criminal justice reform; (3)
providing an opportunity for disempowered defendants to have their day in
court or have their voices heard; (4) helping defendants improve their lives
through advice, counseling and tapping into resources, much like a social
worker; (5) identification with clients' needs because of the lawyer's
33 Interviews play a critical role in data collection in grounded theory studies. It is
recommended that grounded theorists interview twenty to thirty respondents in order to
develop a reliable model or theory with adequate categorization of findings and adequately
categorize these findings. See JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND RESEARCH
DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG FIVE TRADITIONS 56 (1998).
34 I take this to be indicative of either a tendency to believe in innocence (until proven
guilty) or to believe in rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.
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particular background or experiences such as religion, race, ethnicity, and
(possibly) gender; (6) a shared view among defense lawyers leading to the
development of an influential group network and inter-group pressures. A
seventh category was created for miscellaneous motives that did not
correspond into any of the six described above. These themes were used as
a framework with which to code the forty interviews. The coding involved
a verbatim reading of interview transcripts, studying each text line by line,
and highlighting statements falling within the noted themes. The section
that follows focuses on these recurring themes raised by the respondents in
discussing their "causes" and the factors that motivate them.
B. CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS: A LOOK AT
MOTIVATIONS
During the course of the interviews, I began to focus on lawyer
"motivations" in at least two senses of the word. I investigated the factors
that lead lawyers to choose criminal defending as well as those that
influence lawyers' approaches in how they do their jobs. I concluded that
these motivations are best understood by viewing criminal defense
attorneys as a distinctive breed of cause lawyers.
Motivations are notoriously difficult to discern. For every action,
there are likely several influential motivations. The same is true for the
motives of criminal defenders. Moreover, the motives that lead some
attorneys to choose a career as a cause lawyer is often different from the
motives that lead them to remain in these difficult and often poorly paid
careers. Additionally, the "motives" inquiry is further complicated because
its respondents hear one of two distinct questions. There is the "what
motivated you to become a cause lawyer" question and the "what goals
motivate your work" question. The conflation of the two is understandable
because in many instances, a single motivating factor (e.g., outrage over
police brutality, opposition to unfair treatment of poor and minorities)
answers both questions. For example, a lawyer's desire to eradicate police
brutality may be both her inspiration and her goal. Thus, when I refer to
motives, I refer both to the motivators that serve as the lawyers' inspirations
as well as their goals.35 The data shows that few of the lawyers interviewed
were influenced by a single cause or motive. Instead many of them echoed
35 It is not surprising that "cause" can have both a consequential significance as in
"causation" and the meaning of "purpose" as in this is "my cause." See THE OxFoRD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1000-01 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "cause" as "1. That which produces
an effect; that which gives rise to any action, phenomenon, or condition. Cause and effect are
correlative terms .... 3. A fact, condition of matters, or consideration, moving a person to
action; ground of action; reason for action, motive").
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variations of the twelve previously outlined "motives." I consider the wide
mix of motives in greater detail below.
It is worth noting at this juncture that although this paper has as its
focus an examination of criminal defense lawyers as cause lawyers, the data
obtained from the interviews may also be valuable as an independent
contribution to other areas of scholarship.36 Understanding lawyer motives
is also relevant to a host of policy concerns and proposals including the
regulation of lawyers, the encouragement or requirement of pro bono legal
work, and the recruitment and admission policies of law schools.
From the perspective of the cause lawyering scholarship, the data
reveals most notably several commonalities among respondents. The first
commonality noted from the study is that criminal defense lawyers seem to
have a shared ideology or worldview 37 that oddly combines skepticism of
government action with an admiration of its underlying principles. Many
(public) defense attorneys embody the seemingly contradictory position of
working for the government, against the prosecutorial arm of the
government in order to protect what they perceive to be the integrity of a
governmental system of criminal justice. Their principal cause seems to be
a dedication to fighting governmental tyranny and abuse. Variations of this
include a strong desire to help the underdog or to protect the disadvantaged
members of society. Second, the respondent attorneys generally believe
that the process of representation is nearly as important as the result. They
want the experiences of their clients to be as minimally traumatic as
possible. This requires that the attorneys make great efforts to ensure that
their clients feel informed, respected and empowered throughout the
process. Most of the attorneys expressing this view discussed their desire to
"help people" and are committed to the improvement of the lives of
individual clients. And third, the lawyers studied tend to share a group
identity with other criminal defenders and behave as though they are part of
a movement or social agenda of legal reform that transcends their individual
cases. The goal of this movement appears to be to change the way the law
treats the criminally accused. The lawyers had a "soldier" mentality and
were as devoted to their roles as part of a network of criminal defense
lawyers as they were to the changes they sought to promote.
36 The insights and findings from this qualitative study are at the intersection of the
sociology of professions literature, the application of behavioral law and economics to
principal and agent problems, and the law of professional responsibility.
37 See Interview with Attorney 36, at 19 (May 13, 2003). Attorney 36 is a private
attorney who sees a great deal of similarity among the federal public defenders across the
country. He explains, "I've gotten to know a lot of people in federal defenders offices
around the country that way and most of 'em are exactly the same and they're just really
really good people who know the law well." Id.
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The vast majority of the respondent lawyers began by explaining that
the primary goal of their representation was to "help" the client or to obtain
the best result.38 For most attorneys, the best result was always an acquittal
or the lowest possible sentence. But many attorneys realized early on that
those goals were often difficult to attain and were not directly within their
control. 39 As one lawyer explained, even when he does not win, "in those
cases where ... someone's life has been influenced in some small fashion
by how [he] litigated a case, [he] fe[lt] good., 40 Therefore, in conjunction
with winning or reducing the length of confinement, the attorneys
articulated numerous other goals of representation. These additional goals
help elucidate these lawyers' attitudes and beliefs about their roles as
defense attorneys.
1. Procedural Rights And Fairness
The lawyers believed that they were there to guarantee that the
procedural rights of their clients were not trampled upon.4' Many of the
attorneys felt that even if their clients were convicted and received
significant sentences, they would have done a good job if they insured that
their clients enjoyed all the procedural safeguards to which they were
entitled under the law. A related point often articulated by the respondents
38 See Interview with Attorney 22, at 1-3 (Mar. 4, 2003); Interview with Attorney 5, at 1
(Feb. 24, 2003) (explaining a goal of the job as doing "any number of things" to help my
clients); see also Interview with Attorney 34, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2003) ("[T]he best result is
figuring out what it is that the client wants and working toward that."); Interview with
Attorney 27, at 1 (Mar. 10, 2003) (dealing with how the "best" result takes into account
other circumstances of the individual's life); Interview with Attorney 25, at 1 (Mar. 10,
2003) ("And hopefully you know when they're done with me not only will they have the
best possible legal position that they can have, but they'll also be better people for it because
they will have addressed the causes of their behavior.").
39 See Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 2 ("In federal criminal law, the
control that you have over.., the end result.., is not very great because we have the
Guidelines and basically everybody gets pigeonholed into certain... Guidelines.");
Interview with Attorney 11, at 15 (June 12, 2003) (noting that attorneys decried their own
disempowerment as lawyers under the federal scheme and that they described feeling
powerless as advocates in the face of tremendously high stakes in which prosecutors "hold
[all] the cards"). As one respondent put it, the job of the defense attorney has been reduced
to "professional begging." Id. at 2; see also Interview with Attorney 10, at 3 (Feb. 25, 2003)
(explaining that "I feel like I have very limited power, as far as negotiations go ....");
Interview with Attorney 11, supra, at 15 (stating that many lawyers felt that they had been
co-opted into the prosecutorial system and that their role was reduced to "helping them make
the trains run on time"); cf Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 2 (stating that
attorneys can still make a difference "under the right circumstances").
40 Interview with Attorney 33, at 14 (Apr. 21, 2003).
41 Interview with Attorney 32, at 17 (Apr. 21, 2003) (explaining that "these rights are the
foundation of this entire country and that these rights are something to cherish").
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was that they stood prepared to hold the government to its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In many of the interviews, the
lawyers described their work as upholding individual rights and liberties, or
Constitutional rights. 42
Related to the notion of procedural fairness is the idea that every party
in a litigation action deserves a strong and dedicated advocate. These
lawyers are believers in our criminal justice system and see themselves as
the embodiment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.43 Without the
right to effective advocacy, other constitutional rights would be less
meaningful.4 To many of the lawyers interviewed, the belief that a good
defense attorney for the accused is a critical aspect of a strong criminal
justice system motivates them to do the job.
42 See Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 2 ("OK you've got a constitutional
right to have a lawyer defend you and defending you meant fighting a case and making the
government prove it's case beyond a reasonable doubt, challenging the evidence, putting the
client on the stand, testifying that the cops said things or did things that influenced the
evidence in the case."); Interview with Attorney 29, at 8 (Mar. 11, 2003) (discussing how
Fifth Amendment rights run the risk of being infringed upon when prosecution teams get to
defendants before defense attorneys do); Interview with Attorney 27, supra note 38, at 17
("So that's something that really drives me in terms of continuing to do this work, because I
really feel like that's something that people have the right [to]..."); Interview with Attorney
23, at 17 (Mar. 4, 2003) (discussing the client's right to an atpeal); id. at 11 ("My feeling
though is that if I've got to suppress a motion that I think is a legitimate suppression motion,
you know, an illegal search, let's say... I think you have a good argument to make that by
challenging that, you're not expressing a lack of acceptance o [sic] responsibility, you have a
legal right to challenge that.").
43 Interview with Attorney 27, supra note 38, at 17 ("[I]t's always in my belief that
people do, they have that right to be effectively represented. So that's something that really
drives me in terms of continuing to do this work."); Interview with Attorney 24, at 5 (Mar.
10, 2003) ("[P]eople who can't afford a 'paid attorney' should ultimately feel at the end of
the day that 'if I paid this person I wouldn't expect him to do any more than they'd done."').
44 See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDrNG LAWYERS ETHICS 13-42 (1990) ("An
essential function of the adversary system.., is to maintain a free society in which
individual rights are central. In that sense, the right to counsel is the most pervasive of rights
because it affects the client's ability to assert all other rights.") (citation omitted); see also
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[I]n our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him."); Interview with Attorney 27, supra note 38, at 17
("I see such a definite need for people who just don't have the resources to be able to hire an
attorney, to in [sic] still be able to be provided with effective assistance of counsel, not just
counsel, but actually effective assistance of counsel. People who will actually investigate
the case and keep them informed of what's going on.").
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2. Criminal Justice Reform
A number of the respondent attorneys described themselves as
fighters.45 They fight convictions or harsher sentences for their clients, to
be sure, but they also fight the system. The two "fights" were viewed as
symbiotic. For these lawyers, the criminal justice system was badly in need
of repair in one way or another. The ills they sought to combat included
police violence, law enforcement corruption, racism, overly harsh
sentencing policies, prosecutorial abuses, and court processes and
procedures that are unduly partial to the prosecution. All of these are
causes that could be championed during the process of representing
individual defendants.46
The ultimate goal for the lawyers seeking to reform the criminal justice
system is either to change the law as it is written or as it is applied. Some
lawyers target specific cases or statutes that they believe ought to be
overturned and work toward that goal, much like cause lawyers in other
fields work steadily toward a long-term goal of eradicating the death
penalty, legalizing gay marriage, or desegregating schools. Other lawyers
identify certain practices such as racial profiling, automatic detention for
certain crimes or mandatory minimum sentences and seek to challenge
those. These criminal defense attorneys engage in what is often referred to
as impact litigation but they use their criminal defense work as the medium
through which they seek change.
Evidence of this was most stark when talking to lawyers about
deciding when to pursue and when to forego certain legal arguments. Their
decisions were often based not solely on the best interest of the client but
with an eye on the effect it would have on the law. Some lawyers discussed
their decisions to withhold certain arguments for fear of making "bad law
47
while others combed favorable appellate cases in other districts in order to
bring "good law" into their own district when the right case came along. As
one lawyer put it, "you know, there ... is a responsibility not just to the
45 Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 2 (explaining that criminal defending
"mean[s] fighting a case").
46 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 34, supra note 38, at 7 ("I think that the criminal
enforcement in general, specifically federal enforcement, is profoundly unfair: It's motivated
by interests that are inappropriate for this kind of setting. I think that the criminal law targets
the wrong people, and it targets certain people.").
47 Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 8 ("I am a big believer in not fighting
bad guidelines issues.... I'm really wandering on thin ice, we may have a little bit of an
argument, but it's really thin ice. Because I think you lose a certain amount of credibility
when the judge can come in and say, 'Okay, there was an abuse of trust here,' I think you
gain a certain level of credibility. So on the other issues that you may really fight out, you're
better off.").
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client but to make some good law.., to litigate... out of a sense of
responsibility to the system that would do things the right way. '48 For the
most part, these lawyers perceived themselves as agents of legal reform and
believed that their roles as criminal defenders transcended the specific
benefits their advocacy afforded individual clients.
One noteworthy aspect of the criminal defense lawyer's desire to
influence socio-legal reform is what appears as, unfortunately, anti-
governmentalism. 49 Indeed, many defense lawyers describe themselves as
"fighting the government ° and "making the government prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.",5 1 It is probably more accurate to say that
criminal defense lawyers are not anti-government but rather are anti-
government misconduct or abuse.52 They see the potential for government
abuse in all stages of the criminal justice system: political pandering by the
legislature, misconduct by the police, selectiveness and vindictiveness by
prosecutors, arbitrariness and bias by judges, harsh and inhumane
conditions in prisons, and so forth. These lawyers do not see themselves as
defending the criminally accused per se but are committed to defending
"the little guy" against each and every perceived manifestation of
governmental overstepping.53
3. Giving The Defendant A Voice And Ownership Over Process
Although defense lawyers want to obtain substantive results for their
clients, they noted that sometimes defendants also have the need for a
48 See Interview with Attorney 37, at 11 (May 13, 2003).
49 Many of the criminal defense lawyers were overwhelmingly on the political left and
do not seem to oppose "big government" in other contexts as do those on the political right.
Some of these lawyers were arguably libertarians.
50 Interview with Attorney 34, supra note 38, at 7 ("I feel very strongly that no matter
how frustrating it may be and how often we may lose, it is worth it to put up a fight.");
Interview with Attorney 31, at 5 (Apr. 21, 2003) ("[Olftentimes we had fights ... with the
government."); see also Interview with Attorney 28, at 17 (Mar. 11, 2003) (talking about
how sometimes what the defense attorney must "fight" against is demoralizing).
51 Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 2.
52 Interview with Attorney 32, supra note 41, at 1 ("I feel it's very important that there be
a check on the government and the only way that check can be effective is if I do my job to
the best of my ability .... "); see also Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 4 (giving
an example about how it is the role of the defense attorney to make certain that constitutional
violations like unreasonable searches do not get maneuvered around at trial).
53 Interview with Attorney 28, supra note 50, at 7 ("I think the systemic harm is
enormous.... The body of case law in the sentencing guidelines is exclusively intended to
be based upon the law and judges are supposed to look for the heartland in the law....
[O]nly the cases that they see are the cases that the prosecutors choose to have them [sic],




process that allows them to express themselves-their defenses, their
concerns, their fears and their remorse. Not surprisingly, some of the
attorneys cited that a primary goal was to ensure that the client received her
"day in court., 54  This goal can be difficult to accomplish because few
defendants ever testify in court. 55 Accordingly, defense lawyers are the
principal vehicle through which defendants can have their voices heard.
56
For example, one lawyer explained that he gave clients great latitude in
making decisions about the case and about the strategies to be used even
when he had doubts about the client's chosen strategy; it was important for
the client to feel a sense of ownership over the case since it was the client
and not the attorney who would have to live with the result.57 This lawyer
gave the example of a client who insisted that the lawyer call a particular
witness to the stand even though the lawyer doubted that the witness's
testimony would be helpful. Other lawyers gave examples dealing with the
articulation of particular arguments or motions before the court even when
they were certain that the motion would fail. One lawyer stated that
sometimes you have to put on a show for clients: they "appreciate[d] their
story being put forth even though they knew the chances of winning were
very, very low."58 One lawyer gave as an example that she might make a
lengthy and heartfelt argument in favor of releasing a defendant on bond
even when experience dictates that the likelihood of a bond is slim to none.
She related her response to the judges who questioned why she would make
the argument:
[J]udges later tell me, you know I can't release them, why are you making that
argument? My response to the judge is I have to put up a good show for my clients so
54 Id. at 1 (explaining that sometimes defendants express needs other than getting the best
sentence and oftentimes told lawyers, "I need [m]y day in court. I don't care what the
evidence is. I need the government to understand why this happened.").
55 As one attorney explained, "I don't think I have ever put a client on the witness
stand .. " Interview with Attorney 5, supra note 38, at 16. For a more detailed discussion
of why clients rarely testify in federal court, see generally Etienne, supra note 15, at 458-61.
56 See Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 3 (discussing how ultimately a
defense attorney should serve as a vehicle for letting the defendant's voice be heard).
57 Interview with Attorney 21, at 3 (Mar. 4, 2003) ("I personally present a lot of
[decisions] to the client as their rights, even if it is not technically, legally, their right alone to
make. Or their choice alone to make. Even if I know that there are some instances where as
the lawyer I can make the strategic decision to do something, I tend to try to get them on
board or to make that decision themselves. I think that is the only way that really, they are
truly assisting in their defense .... "); see also Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at
3 ("And if we disagree, I'll tell you if I think you're making a choice that's not wise, I'll tell
you why, I just won't tell you it's a bad decision, I'll tell you why I think it's a bad decision,
but ultimately you're going to make those decisions.").
58 Interview with Attorney 31, supra note 50, at 3.
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they sense that I am fighting for them. The judge knows it is a frivolous argument,
and I know it as well, but it is an argument that I will make anyway.
59
The lawyers who were proponents of the defendant's "day in court"
rationale in justifying their work stressed that the criminal justice process
can be particularly dehumanizing for defendants, whether or not they are
guilty.60 They saw it as an important part of their job to humanize the
defendant and help her feel a sense of ownership in the process. 61 As one
lawyer explained, "I'm a criminal defense lawyer because I like to represent
people [as] individuals."62
4. The Social Worker Model: Providing Resources
While some attorneys sought to minimize "the impact of the criminal
justice system" on the lives of their clients,63 others wanted to use the
defendant's contact with authorities to help defendants bring change into
their lives. 64 Most criminal defendants are underprivileged. Three-fourths
of them are indigent and qualify for appointed counsel.65 Many that do not
qualify are nonetheless of modest means and may not have access to
necessary resources. As one lawyer explained, whatever else happens in
the case, my involvement is an opportunity to help the client obtain
resources that she might not have received otherwise. These lawyers assist
their clients in "accessing any community resources" that might help them
bring change to their lives. 66 Examples of such resources included drug
59 Interview with Attorney 9, at 11-12 (Feb. 25, 2003).
60 Interview with Attorney 28, supra note 50, at 1.
61 Interview with Attorney 29, supra note 42, at 11 ("[My] training here was really good
in terms of humanizing."); see also Interview with Attorney 31, supra note 50, at 2;
Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 3; Interview with Attorney 21, supra note 57,
at3.
62 Interview with Attorney 40, at 1 (May 13, 2003).
63 Id. This attorney added,
[For] most of the people who I have ever represented it is their first time. That's not to say
everyone is a first time offender, but most people are. And in my experience most people do not
circle back through the system. And if you can minimize for them the adverse consequences, of
their involvement with this system, and at the same time maximize their, or you know, you just
need to lessen the aggravation for them.
1d.; see also Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 1 ("[In the event they want to
fight the case ... [we help] them prepare to fight it as best as we can. And number two, [we
do] it in a way that minimizes the damage to their lives.").
64 Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 2 ("I think that beyond getting that not
guilty verdict it's the greatest satisfaction to see somebody straighten out their lives.").
65 David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1763
(1993).
66 Questionnaire from Interview with Attorney 3 (Feb. 24, 2003).
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rehabilitations, skills, housing, medical assistance, psychological
counseling,67 or other benefits. At least one attorney explicitly recognized
that she had adopted a social worker's approach to her job.68 It was
knowing that she could make a difference in this way that motivated her to
do criminal defense work and it was one part of the job in which she felt
she had a lasting impact when all else was said and done.
5. Experience and Identity as Motivations
a. Religious Worldview
When asked why they do the work they do, a number of attorneys
discussed their personal values and worldviews.69 One recurring theme to
these answers was a fundamental belief in the need to relate with those less
fortunate. One lawyer explained that she tried to extend the golden rule-
that is, to treat others in the way you want to be treated-to her work in
representing criminal defendants.70 Another explained that he believed in
67 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 40, supra note 62, at 2 ("[Y]ou have now a lot of
people with mental health issues, not only in nursing homes, but in the county jails.");
Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 1 ("And hopefully you know when they're
done with me... they'll also be better people for it because they will have addressed the
causes of their behavior.... [I]f they need a drug program, alcoholic program .... I love to
do that kind of thing. One of the greatest satisfactions I get out of this job is that later on in
your life ... like years after you're done with the client you'll get a card saying how great
they're doing ... they're supporting their family, they've done their programs, they're clean,
they're working and they're being a positive influence in their neighborhood.").
68 Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 1 ("[I]t's just sort of been.., a social
work aspect of being a lawyer that I, I think has become.., the way that I approach my job.
Every case is different and the needs of every person charged are different."); see also
Interview with Attorney 22, supra note 38, at 2-3 (giving an example of an instance in
which, contrary to the wishes of the defendant, the attorney convinced the judge to let the
individual stay with her father as opposed to with her grandmother because it was, in the
attorney's eyes, a better place for her); Interview with Attorney 12, at 1 (June 12, 2003)
(explaining lawyer's role in helping client to find a guardian for her children).
69 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 39, at 13 (May 13, 2003) ("I think it's just a
philosophy of life. You know, that you um, there's just something about not being a bully
and I think most of the time prosecutors are bullies."); Interview with Attorney 27, supra
note 38, at 17 (centering values around the importance of a presumption of innocence and
citing upbringing as being pivotal in creating this worldview); Interview with Attorney 23,
supra note 42, at 24 (feeling that it is supremely important to help the "underdog");
Interview with Attorney 22, supra note 38, at 18 (relating to "the damned" and wanting to
help the "down-trodden"); Interview with Attorney 21, supra note 57, at 25 (feeling that it is
important to provide a client with "a sense of justice").
70 See Interview with Attorney 6, at 22 (Feb. 25, 2003) (explaining that attorney did not
like to file Anders briefs-briefs notifying the appeals court that there are no meritorious
issues-because it was inconsistent with the "golden rule").
1216 [Vol. 95
THE ETHICS OF CA USE LA WYERING
forgiveness and that everyone deserved a second chance.71 It was this
principle that led him to choose criminal defense work and that gave him
comfort as he fought for the rights of criminal defendants. Criminal
defense work was described by one attorney as "God's work" because it
involved the unpopular choice of coming to the aid of society's outcasts.72
Some of these lawyers are like many lawyers whose choice and manner of
work are influenced by their religious beliefs.73
b. Experiential and Personal Background
Aside from these dogmatic and theological explanations, some lawyers
simply credited their penchant for criminal defense work with personality,
childhood background or culture. A lawyer who described himself as an
optimist felt that it was generally his tendency to want to "fight for the
underdog.,74 Another explained that he believed that everyone deserved
"the benefit of the doubt" and so it was easy for him to translate this
personal view into a legal career as a defender.
75
Attorney background also played a role in their career choices.
Interestingly, both lawyers with financially privileged families76 and those
from poor or troubled families cited their backgrounds as motivating forces
for them.77 One lawyer noted that the fact that he grew up with so many
more advantages than a lot of other people may have been a factor drawing
71 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 14, at 2-4 (June 13, 2003) (discussing the goal of
giving clients another chance at life).
72 Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 1 (believing that working as a criminal
defense attorney is like "God's work" in the sense that it is possible to incite "positive social
change" and deal with the "roots" of problems).
73 This emerging view of lawyering is thoroughly explored during a symposium
conference at Fordham Law School. See Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a
Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith Conference, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).
74 Interview with Attorney 39, supra note 69, at 13 (answering in the affirmative that he
liked to "root for the underdog"); Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 24 ("I sort of
identify with the underdog, there's no bigger underdogs than the people we represent.").
71 See Interview with Attorney 27, supra note 38, at 17 ("Even when people ask you
now, they say, 'Oh, you represent criminals.' So that's automatically that assumption that's
out there .... [T]hat's what you're already working with countering.").
76 Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 25 ("I came from an upper-middle class,
white-suburban background... primarily different from my clients-it's significantly
different than my clients. But somewhere along the line the lesson was taught to me that the
only reason I was where I was is because I ... was blessed with enormous opportunities that
other people of equal or greater intellect were not presented with.").
77 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 32, supra note 41, at 19 ("I have a brother who ran
away from home.., when he was young so I haven't talked to him in... 15 years .. ");
Interview with Attorney 18, at 15 (June 13, 2003) ("I grew up, in you know, kind of a tough
neighborhood.., in North New Jersey.").
20051 1217
MARGARETH ETIENNE
him to a career of helping those who were less fortunate.78  Another
explained that when she looked at some of her clients she thought "that
could have been me or my brother., 79 In explaining the kind of lawyers she
sought to hire, one supervising attorney remarked that she looked for people
with a "recognized commitment to working with people in poverty or some
kind of special needs, who have a recognized commitment to helping
others."
80
c. Racial and Ethnic Identification
The feeling of identification with the plight of the criminal defendants
was especially common among minority-race attorneys. The African-
American and Latino/-a lawyers in particular discussed their feelings of
connectedness to their clients, who were also predominantly African-
American or Latino/-a. A number of these lawyers said that their work was
an opportunity to repay a debt to their communities.8'
It is not uncommon to find that minority attorneys lean toward
criminal defense work. Historically, criminal law was the bread and butter
practice of most African-American lawyers.8 2 African-American lawyers
catered almost exclusively to African-American clients in a sharply
segregated America. Because blacks were systematically excluded from
78 Interview with Attorney 32, supra note 41, at 18 ("I really feel that I was almost like
born with it. You know, I can remember as a little kid... I just always felt like some people
were getting a raw deal. I was in [sic] my grammar school was mixed, you know racial
background and everything and... I went to a party when I was like in [third] grade and a
girl that I was crazy about [who] was black and I went there and I just said something is not
right here .... [She] lived in a poor area and I just I didn't understand it.... ."); see also
Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 25.
79 Interview with Attorney 6, supra note 70, at 4 ("[I] look at them like I would as a
loved one, not just as putting myself in the shoes of a client, but also pretending that that is
my brother or my sister."); cf Interview with Attorney 19, at 11 (June 13, 2003) (explaining
that if ever in the defendant's position, he would want an attorney who "would be looking at
my life like it was either their life or their children's life").
80 Interview with Attorney 28, supra note 50, at 4 ("I look for somebody who's willing to
learn, who seems to be passionate about the idea of doing the work, probably not the work
'cause they've probably not done much of it... who has recognized commitment to working
with people in poverty or some kind of special needs, who have a recognized commitment to
helping others.").
81 Interview with Attorney 15, at 3 (June 13, 2003) ("[If] they're.., school teachers or
people who live in my community and if it's something in state court or misdemeanor
court... I'll just represent them for free."). The attorney went on to state, "[I]t was a great
way to learn you know, and a great way to serve the community at the same time and getting
[sic] professional enjoyment." Id. at 23-24.
82 Aaron Porter, Norris, Schmidt, Green, Harris, Higginbothom & Associates: The
Sociological Import of Philadelphia Cause Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 4, at
162.
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many commercial enterprises, they had fewer commercial legal needs.
However, blacks and other minorities have not been excluded from the
reach of criminal laws, as criminal laws have always played an important
role in controlling all sorts of behavior (including traditionally non-criminal
behavior) in minority and impoverished communities. 83
The nexus between civil rights law and criminal defense work is a
second explanation for the black lawyer's interest in criminal law; it is not
that African-Americans are somehow more altruistic when it comes to
careers upholding the cause of criminal justice or other civil rights related
causes. Just as African-American lawyers played a crucial role in the
advancement of civil rights, the civil rights movement was crucial to the
success and advancement of African-American lawyers.
84
Today's African-American attorneys continue to recognize the roles
that civil rights and inequality play in their own lives and those of close
friends and family. They view the protection of the rights of the
underprivileged as being in their self-interest. 85  In addition to the self-
83 See, e.g., Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the
Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 667, 671, 674-86 (2004)
(discussing generally the history of American policing after Reconstruction as a means of
controlling poor and working class people and describing vagrancy laws in particular as a
means of regulating labor and imposing a work ethic ideology).
It is not surprising that many of the most famous civil rights cases sprang from
criminal matters. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (known also as the
Scottsboro Boys Case) (reversing rape convictions and death sentences of eight African-
American boys on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 538 (1896) (affirming Petitioner Plessy's arrest and conviction under Louisiana
law that provided "for separate railway carriages for white and colored races" based on the
"separate but equal" doctrine); Jo ANN GIBSON ROBINSON, THE MONTGOMERY Bus BOYCOTT
AND THE WOMEN WHO STARTED IT: THE MEMOIR OF Jo ANN GiBSON ROBNSON 43-44 (David
J. Garrow ed., 1987) (documenting how Rosa Parks' criminal arrest for refusing to surrender
her seat to a white man led to the successful Montgomery bus boycott and the striking down
of Alabama's bus segregation laws); see also Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip Hop
Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 983, 985-86, 1015 (2004) (arguing that the hip hop
nation-which the author describes as a transformative and multicultural socio-political
movement among white, black, Asian and Latino youth-perceives that criminal laws are at
times used as an instrument of racial subordination).
84 Porter, supra note 82, at 157-58. As Porter notes with the example of Charles
Hamilton Houston, the chief engineer behind the legal strategy of the civil rights movement:
African American participation in the economic and political life of the country was in the best
interest of Houston, his lawyers, and the black community in general.... It was in [Houston's]
interest to have a personal commitment toward the idea of fairness in equality of opportunity,
although all educated black masses would benefit from such equality.
Id.
85 I do not mean to suggest that defense work has a monopoly on these goals when it
comes to criminal law. As an interesting aside, African-Americans are increasingly joining
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interest motive that many minority criminal defense attorneys experience, a
number of minority attorneys believe that they have a duty to "give
something back" to their communities. One prominent scholar has named
this the "obligation thesis. 86 Consistent with his "obligation thesis", many
of the minority attorneys interviewed described a sense of kinship with their
minority clients. At least one specifically described his cause as improving
the condition of African-Americans. 87 It is not to say that these African-
American lawyers felt less of a professional obligation toward their non-
minority clients but rather that their motivation to engage in the work in the
first place was brought on by the personal obligation they felt toward
members of their minority communities.
d. Gender
Contrary to the roles that race and ethnicity play as a motivating factor
in cause lawyering, none of the respondents claimed that gender played a
role in motivating attorneys to choose criminal defense work. Not one of
the women attorneys interviewed provided a gendered justification for her
choice of work. As the "gender-based motive" argument goes, women
engage in an ethic of care that leads them to empathize with oppressed or
the ranks of prosecutors. This phenomenon is not inconsistent with the recognition that
issues of racial inequity and discrimination will continue to be fought on the terrain of
criminal law. Some African-Americans may choose to prosecute because "[p]rosecutors,
more than any other officials in the system, have the power, discretion, and responsibility to
remedy the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the criminal justice process."
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 17-18 (1999) (arguing that prosecutors have tremendous power and
discretion to cause or remedy discrimination against African-Americans as defendants and
victims of crime); cf Kenneth B. Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African-Americans
Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1473, 1505 (2000) (questioning whether individual
African-American prosecutors can be agents of social change in the black community given
political and professional pressures on the prosecutor's role).
86 David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981, 1983-84 (1993).
Specifically speaking of corporate lawyers, the obligation thesis holds that successful blacks
have moral obligations to help the black community that must be balanced against other
professional and personal commitments when making particular decisions and when
constructing a moral life plan. Id.
87 Interview with Attorney 14, supra note 71, at 3-4 ("I was involved in the Black
Student Movement in the 60's. President of the Black Student Union, Vice-President of
Production, President in high school, Vice-President at the University of Nebraska, um, so I
came out, when I, went to law school, I went to law school with a mission. And, that
mission was to in some way alleviate the conditions of the African-American people. I
mean, that's what I went there for. And, and, and I, and I kind of swore once I took the bar
exam that I would never betray that.").
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subordinated people.88 As lawyers, their feminine side leads them to choose
careers in which they can play out the caring or nurturing instincts that
prioritize relationship-centered approaches over rights-centered
approaches.89 One explanation for this absence might be that the gender-
based stereotype (even if true) cuts both ways when it comes to criminal
law. Both defendants and crime victims can be viewed empathetically and
are logical beneficiaries of an ethic of care. At least one scholar lamented
the fact that criminal defendants were too often indistinguishable from their
victims as a group. 90 It is possible that women might be more likely to
identify with crime victims than with the alleged perpetrators of crimes
(especially in sex crimes, domestic violence and property crimes where
women are particularly vulnerable). Of course, this is mere conjecture
because this study did not explore this precise question with respondents.
6. Colleagues and the Defense Bar as Motivators
The vast majority of the attorneys in the study had not practiced in any
other legal field but criminal defense. Nor did they want to. When asked if
she had ever considered prosecuting cases, one lawyer emphatically
answered "Never!"91  Another lawyer stated that she would leave the
practice of law altogether if she ever quit being a defense attorney.92 These
88 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism,
and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75, 76-77 & nn.8-9 (1994) ("Opposed to male
moral reasoning was the female 'ethic of care,' based on the structure of the 'web.' This
female ethic was grounded in a relational, connected, contextual form of reasoning that
focused on people, as well as the substance of a problem.").
89 Interview with Attorney 19, supra note 79, at 12 ("I started doing this kind of work
because I wanted to help people and that was my whole goal. I never wanted to be any other
kind of lawyer other than a criminal defense lawyer and I always did it because I wanted to
help people."); Interview with Attorney 3, at 3 (Feb. 24, 2003) (referring to the role of the
defense attorney as that of both a shepherd and a social worker and concluding that it is
consistent with her goals to be that sort of "support person").
90 Harvard Law Professor and criminal defense attorney Charles Ogletree described his
growing discomfort in the role of defender when he began to realize how much victims and
defendants-both often poor and black-resembled one another. "When victims become
indistinguishable from clients, I become very introspective about what I am doing in the
process, very self-critical about the role lawyers play." SARA LAWRENCE-LIGHTFOOT, I'VE
KNOWN RrVERS: LivEs OF Loss AND LIBERATION 130 (1994).
91 Questionnaire from Interview with Attorney 10 (Feb. 25, 2003); see supra Part I.A.2,
Figure 3; see also Interview with Attorney 39, supra note 69, at 13 ("I could never be a
prosecutor."); Interview with Attorney 19, supra note 79, at 12 ("I never wanted to be any
other kind of lawyer other than a criminal defense lawyer.").
92 Interview with Attorney 34, supra note 38, at 7 ("I cannot imagine not doing this...
and I don't mean just that I can't imagine retiring .... I cannot imagine going a week or two
weeks without, like really caring, not just having to care, but really caring about what
happens to these people.").
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answers were somewhat surprising given how difficult criminal defense
work can be. Many cause lawyers enter their fields completely devoted to
their causes but then experience "burn out" after a few years. The lawyers
interviewed for this study went on to explain that they were continually
motivated by their friends and compatriots in the criminal defense bar.93
Although they too experienced fatigue and burn out, they were rejuvenated
by attending criminal defense conferences, exchanging ideas with other
defense lawyers, and even watching each other in court or hearing of one
another's victories.94 As one lawyer put it, "[W]e see each other in court.
We read each other's motions and.., it gives us that hope,... provides us
that impetus to be zealous.., to be the best advocates we can be .... "9'
Many lawyers were proud to be members of what they viewed as an
exclusive group of attorneys. It was important to them that they retained
the respect of their colleagues 96 and were not perceived as incompetent,
lazy, or worse yet, as "sell-outs." 97 Many lawyers repeatedly explained that
their colleagues-whether through positive or negative reinforcement-
were one of the primary influences over what kind of advocates they were.
93 Interview with Attorney 40, supra note 62, at 16 ("The people in the office, and I
would say it's the defense bar [that] influences us greatly.").
94 Interview with Attorney 34, supra note 38, at 8 ("I think ... it's so interesting going to
court or co-counseling with other attorneys, especially in this office, we all have such
different styles, and sometimes you know, you reach past the client or the prosecutor, just
bringing in somebody else who's so different than you is really what you need, but we're all
so different that I take a little bit away from everyone that I work with, and learn a little bit
from each and every person in this office.").
95 See Interview with Attorney 31, supra note 50, at 19.
96 See Interview with Attorney 9, supra note 59, at 12 (explaining that "it has been
ingrained in me from my colleagues that you just don't want to screw your clients that
way").
97 Many of the lawyers interviewed spoke often in disparaging terms about lawyers that
were widely considered "bad lawyers" by their peers. The desire not to be so categorized by
peers was one factor, among others, that motivated some attorneys to do a good job. See,
e.g., Interview with Attorney 39, supra note 69, at 5 ("I don't think that anything that the
client does really changes the performance of that lawyer. Either they're lazy and do a bad
job or incompetent and do a bad job .. "); Interview with Attorney 37, supra note 48, at 28
("[Y]ou know there are attorneys who are lazy and this is regardless of the guidelines, you
know, want to plead out all their cases, you know, take a retainer fee, plead out their case
and.., go fishing."); Interview with Attorney 8, at 19 (Feb. 25, 2003) ("[S]o it looks like the
retained counsel is filing that motion in court a lot and fighting for them and all, that is like
salesmanship in some ways .... The retained counsel would file things just to make the
impression to the client.").
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7. Material and Miscellaneous Motives
Not all the motives discussed by the attorneys were related to cause
lawyering. In addition to those discussed above, many of the lawyers
mentioned motives for choosing their work that had little to do with the
common themes of cause lawyering. There were both positive and negative
motivators. They talked about the compensation, the autonomy of having
to answer to no one but the client, the improved hours over large law firms,
and the early litigation experience available in criminal work. Others
discussed feeling initially excluded from top government or law firm jobs
for reasons ranging from being minorities to mediocre grades in law school.
Although no one said this explicitly, a few of the attorneys seemed to
remain in their fields out of inertia. Although these motives have little to do
with cause lawyering, they are important to mention insofar as it should be
acknowledged the presence of other motives does not necessarily negate
cause lawyering as a major motivating factor. That is, it may be possible
for a cause lawyer to be motivated by a mix of traditional "causes" and also
be attracted to the work for reasons unrelated to a cause.
II. CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS: THEORETICAL
SUPPORT
While Part I of the paper is empirical, Part II is grounded in theory-
applying the existing literature on cause lawyering to the enterprise of
criminal defending. The purpose here is to define the theoretical conception
of cause lawyering, to determine whether and where criminal defenders fit.
The study of cause lawyering contributes to our understanding of social
movements and legal reform. Likewise, an appreciation of criminal defense
lawyers as cause lawyers can reveal scores about the nature and progress of
criminal law reform.
As part of the study of socio-legal change, scholars have long been
trying to define cause lawyering, recognize its forms, and understand its
motivations. They have done so largely by attempting to determine the
boundaries of cause lawyering-that is, determining what it is by
distinguishing what it is not.98 Must these lawyers serve traditional liberal
causes or can they serve conservative ideals?99  Can they represent
98 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 33.
99 See, e.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology,
and Social Distance, 37 LAW & Soc'y REv. 5, 7 (2003) ("Some of the lawyers serving
conservative causes are motivated by ideological commitment... Lawyers for religious,
patriotic, and libertarian groups are, perhaps, more likely than business lawyers to be driven
primarily by ideals rather than by financial gain or professional advancement.").
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individuals or groups and classes of people?'00 Can they be employed by
the government, large firms, or individuals?' 01  Can they be paid
handsomely for their work or must the work be remuneratively altruistic? 0 2
Can their opponents also be cause lawyers? Is traditional litigation required
or can they be activists, demonstrators and lobbyists? Must they be full-
time public interest lawyers or can private attorneys doing pro-bono work
be included as cause lawyers?
10 3
In the conventional literature on cause lawyering, the paradigmatic
cause lawyer is a poorly-paid altruistic attorney who handles impact
litigation cases on broad constitutional or moral issues. The often touted
examples of cause lawyers are human rights lawyers, civil rights and civil
liberties lawyers, environmental lawyers, and anti-abortion lawyers. 04
Criminal defense attorneys, whose cause is often the individual freedom of
a particular defendant (without regard to guilt or innocence), are often
omitted from the studies of cause lawyering. 10 5 The exclusion of traditional
criminal defense lawyers is in some respects understandable. Criminal
defense attorneys are often uncharitably depicted as using legal
"technicalities" to represent individual defendants despite who these
defendants are and what they have done rather than because of it. While
what they do in some ways resembles public interest work, the similarities
extend principally to the high case-loads, impoverished clients, squalid
work places, and low salaries that have become emblematic of the condition
of the government lawyer.
If in fact criminal defense attorneys are cause lawyers, they are an
interesting case precisely because they defy the conventional stereotypes of
cause or public interest lawyers. It is feasible that no case need be made for
classifying criminal defense lawyers as cause lawyers. Much of the recent
scholarship on cause lawyering has focused on questioning the perceived
boundaries between conventional and cause lawyers. Prominent
100 See Sarat, supra note 4, at 333 (explaining that for some death penalty attorneys,
successful cause lawyering is expressed in the important and intense relationships formed
with individual clients); Sterett, supra note 11, at 307 (discussing the radical lawyer's focus
on individual clients rather than on the cause in Britain).
101 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (articulating the changing nature of litigation toward broad social reform cases,
often involving government, rather than litigation between private parties).
102 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
103 Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social Justice and the
Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 4, at 201 (arguing for a
reconsideration of the assumed separation between socially conscious lawyering and private
practice).
104 SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 5.
105 The exception to this is the anti-death penalty attorney. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 4.
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contributors to the field tell us that cause lawyers can be private as well as
public,'16 can represent class actions and impact cases as well as individual
clients, 10 7 can be poorly-compensated or well-paid, can be altruistic or
harbor ulterior motives. 1
08
Criminal defense attorneys themselves encompass a diverse group,
clouding certain classifications. They bridge the divide between public
interest and private practice, between government attorneys and anti-
establishment lawyers, between poorly paid and well-compensated
professionals, between impact litigation lawyers and advocates for
individuals. This further makes the branding of defense attorneys as cause
lawyers more difficult.
Nevertheless, the interviews with lawyers suggest that many criminal
defense attorneys perceive themselves to be cause lawyers motivated by
moral, political and ideological convictions. While this self-perception is
instructive in categorizing defense attorneys as cause lawyers, it cannot be
dispositive. The fact that criminal defense lawyers defy an easy
categorization as cause lawyers helps illustrate that cause lawyering is a
"contested concept ' '10 9 with room for divergent attorney practices and
experiences. The literature on cause lawyering and on the taxonomy of
cause lawyers emphasizes that cause lawyering can take on a wide variety
of forms.
Although scholars recognize the breadth of forms that cause lawyering
can take, it is not so fluid as to become meaningless. There is some
agreement about a general definition. The term cause lawyer describes the
activist lawyer who is committed to using the law as a vehicle for building a
"good" society.1 0 Because cause lawyers-also referred to as social justice
lawyers-seek social change, they defy the common view of lawyering as a
purely instrumentalist endeavor in which legal professionals are hired to
secure whatever goal the client desires."' For these activist lawyers, the
client's goal may reflect the greater cause but it is not necessarily an end in
itself.
106 Scott Barclay & Ann-Maria Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a Movement,
and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in Vermont,
in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 171
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005).
107 Sterett, supra note 11, at 239-316.
108 SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 5.
109 Id.
110 Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
ProfessionalAuthority, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 4, at 3.
111 SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 3.
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The stereotypical cause lawyer has strong moral convictions that she
seeks to effectuate through her work. Her work is most commonly
litigation or client representation. Her work is part of a social movement in
pursuit of an ideal or the protection of a group. She is often a dissident and
an opponent of authoritative figures and institutions. When the cause
lawyer represents individual people or takes on specific cases, they are
generally in pursuit of furtherance of incremental changes that are part of a
greater strategy. She gets paid little for hard and unpopular work that can
bear significant social, professional and status costs. The stereotypes have
been increasingly questioned, if not debunked, in cause lawyering studies.
Criminal defense lawyers, for example, complicate any attempts to
simplify the conception of the cause lawyer as they are not a monolithic
group. Some defense lawyers often have strong ideological and political
beliefs that they seek to effectuate through their work, but others have
chosen the profession because they enjoy the fight itself. They represent
individuals, but over time tend to think of these individuals as a class. This
is especially true for public defenders who represent so many individuals
serially that their corpus of clients resembles a group. 1 2 Moreover, some
define their work not by whom they represent but by whom they oppose.
Their purpose is to challenge law enforcement and the government.
Criminal defense lawyers do not necessarily fit the stereotype of public
interest lawyers who are poorly compensated. These lawyers are
simultaneously some of the worst and best compensated attorneys in the
profession. In addition, the work settings for criminal defending run the
gamut from the public defender's office to some of the nation's most
prestigious law finns. Their clients can be drug dealers, traffic violators,
tax evaders, white collar executives, the mafia or institutions. Although the
public defenders and appointed attorneys are not government employees in
the traditional sense, they are typically paid by a governmental entity.
Finally, criminal defense lawyers are critical players in the criminal justice
system. The system could not, constitutionally, function without them.
Thus, these cause lawyers are in the odd situation of legitimizing the very
system and laws they seek to challenge.
Despite some of these anomalies in the criminal defense enterprise,
there can be little doubt that they are cause lawyers. Admittedly my
112 1 am reminded of a federal trial I once witnessed where the prosecutor, in his final
opportunity to sway the jury, began his closing argument with the trembling words: "Ladies
and Gentlemen of the jury, I represent the people of the United States of America." Not to
be bested, when it was his turn to address the jury, the defense attorney began: "Ladies and
Gentlemen of the jury, I too represent people of the United States of America. I just do it
one person at a time."
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research shows that not every criminal defense attorney interviewed is
motivated solely or even predominantly by "the cause.", 1" 3 Nonetheless that
does not disqualify criminal defending as a profession that is generally
occupied by cause lawyers. As Marshall and Barclay explain, many
lawyers who would accurately be categorized as cause lawyers are
frequently excluded by scholars because they do not fit squarely into the
cause lawyering framework.' 1 4  Lawyers, who work in firms, are
handsomely paid, handle cases outside of their "causes," or do not even
identify themselves with a cause, may nonetheless be cause lawyers.
Marshall and Barclay caution that scholars of cause lawyering do best to
emphasize the "cause" over the "lawyer" because focusing on the lawyer's
habits, practice or demographics leads to an overly rigid and under-
inclusive approach. A cause-centered approach ultimately provides a more
nuanced view of social movements and those involved in them." 5
III. MANAGING CONFLICTS
Having established that many criminal defense lawyers are cause
lawyers, the question arises: What difference does this make? Do criminal
defense lawyers qua cause lawyers handle their cases differently? Are their
clients better off or worse off? I argue that lawyers who are guided by their
own moral and political values-in addition to the ethical and professional
rules-are better lawyers for criminal defendants. For them, the baseline of
what constitutes successful advocacy is generally higher. In addition, the
stakes of advocacy are greater for lawyers who are concerned about both
the client and the cause. It stands to reason however that the greatest
danger arises when there is a potential conflict between the cause pursued
by the lawyer and either the interests of the client or the norms of the
profession. In other words, if we are to evaluate the merits of criminal
cause lawyers, a critical part of that evaluation must turn on how they
manage conflicts.
One very distinct feature of cause lawyering is the nature of the ethical
and professional conflicts encountered and how they are resolved. For all
cause lawyers there exists, at least theoretically, a tension between serving
the individual client and serving the social cause. Under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
attorneys must, first and foremost, represent the interests of their clients.
116
11 See supra Part I.B.7.
114 See generally Barclay & Marshall, supra note 106.
115 Id.
116 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A lawyer must.., act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client...."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
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And they must do so zealously. 117 These guidelines say nothing of the
lawyer's own cause. The cause lawyer hopes that her cause and the client's
interests will be compatible, if not identical. However, the potential for
conflict may be heightened for the criminal defense attorney who must use
all legal means at her disposal to help defend her client regardless of her
own feelings about the client's innocence and whether the client's release is
in society's best interest.
At first blush there appears to be little room in the criminal defense
enterprise for any cause other than the defendant's freedom. But the
lawyers interviewed during the course of the qualitative study described
above found interesting ways to handle the conflicts that arise in their work.
Some of these situations were not perceived as conflicts by the lawyers but
seem, from the outsider's perspective, to involve very real potential for
conflict. In this section, I consider three examples of the types of
"conflicts" commonly faced by the attorney respondents in the study.
First, I examine the criminal cause lawyer's desire to allow each
defendant a day in court regardless of the merits of the defendant's
argument. One example of this dilemma occurs when attorneys refuse to
file Anders briefs. The refusal to file such briefs conflicts with the
attorney's duty, as an officer of the court, to refrain from filing frivolous
motions. A second conflict involves the cause lawyer's temptation to use
collective action to improve the condition of criminal defendants as a group
even when it poses risks to individual defendants. The two examples of
collective action presented by the respondent attorneys were used to combat
prosecutorial or government policies. In one instance, some lawyers
described the prosecutorial policy of requiring defendants to waive
appellate rights in plea agreements, and in another instance the execution of
Miranda warnings for bilingual defendants. The third conflict entails the
triage criminal cause lawyers engage in when they attempt to be selective in
determining which claims to make for which clients. They do so with an
eye of reserving certain issues for test cases or foregoing certain claims to
reserve credibility for future cases. The situations described by the defense
lawyers involved conflicts between the court and professional rules and
their visions of their roles as cause lawyers, conflicts between client's
immediate interests and the cause, and between present clients and future
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not intentionally... [flail to seek
the lawful objectives of the client through reasonably available means permitted by law and
the disciplinary rules.").
117 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must also act... with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1
("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law.").
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clients. I contend later that all of these practices are to some degree
endemic to cause lawyering but they present conflicts of interest and would
be prohibited by a strict reading of the professional responsibility rules.
A. THE ANDERS BRIEF: NAVIGATING THE DUTIES TO THE COURT
VERSUS THE CLIENT
Criminal defense lawyers who are cause lawyers oftentimes face
ethical conflicts between their perceived duties to the profession as officers
of the court and their perceived duties to their clients. 118 This sort of
conflict is not unique to cause lawyers1 19 but may take different forms in the
cause lawyer context. One particular variation of this conflict for criminal
defense lawyers who are cause lawyers arises with the filing of Anders
briefs on appeal.
An indigent criminal defendant has the constitutional right to the
assistance of appointed counsel that generally extends to the first appeal.
20
In some instances, attorneys are appointed in cases in which no meritorious
appellate issues exist. A court appointed attorney saddled with an appeal
that appears to lack grounds faces the choice of either filing a frivolous
appeal or informing the court (almost certainly against the client's wishes)
that there are no worthwhile claims to present. The vehicle by which an
attorney could communicate the lack of meritorious issues and her
subsequent desire to withdraw is called an Anders brief-named for a 1967
Supreme Court case. 12 1  The Anders brief allows the attorney a
constitutional yet graceful retreat from an appeal she perceives to be
frivolous. 22 By submitting an Anders brief, an attorney can circumvent the
conflict between protecting the defendant's constitutional rights to access to
118 See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility and Regulating Advocacy: Making
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2115-17 (2003)
(describing conflicts arising between a lawyer's obligations to the legal system and her
obligations to the client).
119 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. § 9 ("In the nature of law practice,
however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems
arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to
the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory
living.").
120 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
121 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
122 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) ("A lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous .. "); David Mote, Appealing Issues, BACK
BENCHER, Jan. 1998, http://www.ca7.uscourts.govibenchvl0.htm ("Fed. R. App. P. 38...
require[s] that all appeals and arguments be well grounded and provide[s] for sanctions for
making frivolous arguments or filing frivolous appeals.").
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the appellate process 123 and the lawyer's ethical responsibility to pursue
only claims of merit.124 The key to preserving constitutionality 25 is that the
attorney remains an "active advocate on behalf of [her] client," even if she
finds the appeal lacking merit. 
126
The safeguards in place under Anders to insure "active advocacy" are
quite strenuous. 127  Judges require that the Anders brief meet the strict
requirements laid out in Anders v. California.128  Nonetheless for most
criminal defense lawyers who are committed to the cause of helping their
needy and often disadvantaged clients, 129 the filing of an Anders brief
against the client's wishes and interests is perceived as a betrayal. Not
surprisingly, many of the attorneys I interviewed avoided writing Anders
briefs in any circumstances. They devised clever ways to justify their
decisions not to file Anders briefs or to avoid the conflict altogether.
123 Anders, 386 U.S. at 745 ("This procedure will assure penniless defendants the same
rights and opportunities on appeal.., as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar
situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel."); see also Mary R.
True, The Constitutional Basis of the Indigent Appellant's Right to Appointed Counsel:
Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988), 58 U. CiN. L. REv. 1137, 1149 (1990).
While the Anders Court primarily based their decision on the necessity of protecting the
defendants' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, subsequent caselaw has added to
the analysis the attorney's ethical duty to withdraw in the event that the appeal sought is
frivolous. See McCoy v. Wis. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1988) ("Although a
defense attorney has a duty to advance all colorable claims and defenses, the canons of
professional ethics impose limits on permissible advocacy.").
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
125 Cases after Anders also discuss, in more detail than Anders, the constitutional
concerns implicated by the defendant's due process rights and right to counsel. See Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (finding that the Ohio Court of Appeals failed a defendant in
first granting appellate counsel's motion to withdraw, and then failing to appoint new
counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (asserting that Anders recognized a due
process right as well, by requiring effective assistance of counsel during a defendant's first
appeal).
126 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 ("A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
127 The attorney must first perform a "conscientious examination" of the case. Anders,
386 U.S. at 744. If she then finds the appeal to be "wholly frivolous," she must notify the
court and request the court's consent to withdraw. Id. Next, she must file a brief discussing
any potential appellate issues and also allow her client to review the brief, giving the client
time to raise further points if desired. Id. The burden then falls on the court to review the
brief and decide whether or not the appeal is truly frivolous. Id.
128 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Andrea Lynn Evensen, Ethics Extra: Removing Illinois
Attorneys From Between the Ethical Rock and a Hard Place: Illinois Current Anders
Requirements Should Be Reconsidered, 18 CHI. B. Ass'N REc. 56 (2004).
129 See supra Part I.B.
1230 [Vol. 95
THE ETHICS OF CA USE LA WYERING
Of the defense attorneys interviewed, only five had ever filed an
Anders brief.130 Each of the interviewed attorneys that had filed an Anders
brief in the past had done so only once 13 and seemed to do have done so
with great reluctance. One of the few attorneys who had written an Anders
brief in the past explained, "I hated having to argue against my client.'5132
When another was asked why she had filed only one in her career, she
responded, "I just feel like if you have some sort of an argument go ahead
and make it to the client that is all. I guess it is sort of ideological."'' 33
The attorneys who had not filed Anders briefs gave various
explanations for avoiding them. Of particular concern to many of the
interviewees was a belief in the client's right to appeal, and the attorney's
duty to zealously advocate for the client.134 Many attorneys feel as if the
Anders brief is a sign of disloyalty to the client. As one lawyer explained:
[T]o me an Anders Brief is almost like a slap in the face to the client. Why are you
even bothering to write the brief, if all you are going to say is here is all the reasons to
deny relief. To me it is sort of inherently conflicts with your obligation to represent
the client zealously .... To me it is just contrary to every instinct I have as the
defense lawyer to get up in public, a public document, say my client is a loser, or his
issues are loser issues.'
5
According to another attorney, filing an Anders brief is tantamount to
surrendering or waving a "white flag" on the client's behalf.,36 Perhaps for
this reason, there seems to be a stigma attached to any attorney filing an
Anders brief. Some attorneys noted that their colleagues actively or
130 See Interview with Attorney 40, supra note 62, at 13 (asserting that Anders briefs in
her office are rare, because of the limited appellate work they do; also stating that she avoids
writing an Anders brief by withdrawing at the district court level); Interview with Attorney
37, supra note 48, at 24 ("[T]he one time I did an Anders Brief... I truly felt ethically
anything else would of [sic] been frivolous; on the other hand if I can find a borderline
frivolous issue, then I'll bring through on Anders."); Interview with Attorney 36, supra note
37, at 17 ("[T]here just was no ... question there was no argument that could be made.., so
and I didn't have a choice but to file it."); Interview with Attorney 32, supra note 41, at 14;
Interview with Attorney 7, at 12 (Feb. 25, 2003).
131 See Interview with Attorney 40, supra note 62, at 13; Interview with Attorney 37,
supra note 48, at 23; Interview with Attorney 36, supra note 37, at 17; Interview with
Attorney 32, supra note 41, at 14; Interview with Attorney 7, supra note 130, at 12.
132 Interview with Attorney 36, supra note 37, at 18.
133 Interview with Attorney 7, supra note 130, at 13.
134 See Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 17.
135 Interview with Attorney 10, supra note 39, at 14.
136 Interview with Attorney 7, supra note 130, at 13.
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covertly discouraged the action.1 37 Others consider fellow lawyers that file
Anders briefs as "lazy."
'138
Because attorneys do not like to file Anders briefs, they find all sorts
of justifications for avoiding them. Most attorneys faced with a conflict
between their obligation to the client and their ethical obligation to avoid
bringing frivolous cases largely opt in favor of the client. One attorney,
confronted with a "very weak and terrible issue," appealed anyway.
1 39
Another, considering the possibility, asserted that:
I would think that if... [I'm] in a position to do [an Anders brief], I'd rather write up
an appeal in which I had an issue no matter how weak the issue was than write up an
appeal in which I had to explain why every issue I considered is a failure. I mean if
you're gonna have to write it, I'd just rather write something I was adversarial in and.
acting as an advocate.
140
Some attorneys viewed the Anders dilemma not as a formalistically
ethical problem but rather as a moral problem. One attorney was quite
blunt: "I know it's not an ethical problem. I think it's immoral. I don't
think any defense attorney should ever file one. 141 Other attorneys argued
that not filing Anders briefs seemed more consistent with their ethical
obligations as officers of the court than filing them. They argued that filing
the Anders brief was time consuming and a waste of resources for the
court.1 42  Most lawyers explained that preparing an Anders brief often
requires much more writing than an appeal itself.1 43 Anders briefs "take
like 10 times the amount of time and energy that filing an actual appellate
brief does," said one attorney. 144 In support of this belief, one interviewee
described the typical Anders process:
Frankly, the Anders brief is more work than the other one, because [here is] ... almost
always what [our] Circuit does: [When] you file an Anders brief, which takes a lot of
137 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 11; Interview with Attorney
23, supra note 42, at 17; Interview with Attorney 8, supra note 97, at 17.
138 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 39, supra note 69, at 20; Interview with Attorney
37, supra note 48, at 24; Interview with Attorney 8, supra note 97, at 17; Interview with
Attorney 3, supra note 89, at 11.
139 Interview with Attorney 24, supra note 43, at 11.
140 Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 16.
141 Interview with Attorney 5, supra note 38, at 9.
142 For a contrary view, see James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way For the
ABA: Smith v. Robbins Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
65, 103-06 (2001) and Frederick D. Junkin, The Right to Counsel in "Frivolous" Criminal
Appeals: A Reevaluation of the Guarantees of Anders v. California, 67 TEx. L. REv. 181,
187 (1988).
143 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 19 ("But I think as a practical
matter, it's harder to do, it's more work.").
144 Interview with Attorney 34, supra note 38, at 11.
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time because you have to argue why all these issues are not issues [our] circuit will
look at it ... and say, "Well, we disagree with you on this issue," or they'll issue an
order saying, "here's an issue we think you should appeal that you didn't discuss."
So ... you've filed the Anders brief, and.., now you've got to brief this other issue,
which the Circuit says you should have-you feel kind of foolish then. You file [the
issue identified by the court], you go up and argue it, and you're in this sort of
awkward position because you're advocating a position that you first either didn't
think about or said you didn't believe in. And then what usually happens almost
always is that the Circuit denies it anyways. So, raise this issue[], and so you do all
this work raising this issue, and then they say, "well, no, you're wrong." So to me it's
easier, it's just less time consuming, to find some sort of legal foothold to raise [the
standard appeal]. 
145
Another strategy used by attorneys to avoid filing the Anders brief
involves persuading the client to forego the appeal. If the client can be
persuaded to waive the right to appeal, this effectively nullifies the conflict
between actively following the client's wishes and responsible use of court
resources. Most lawyers thought that if one searched hard enough, there
was almost always an appealable issue to be found. But as one lawyer said,
"if you reach that point, your client needs to understand why an appeal is
not the right course of action.
146
Finally, some attorneys avoided the conflict altogether by adopting a
very limited definition of frivolousness and often found merit in issues that
had been squarely decided against them. 47 They adlhitted that the meaning
of frivolity seems to differ between defense attorneys and the judges and
prosecutors. Many of the defense attorneys think that the charge of
145 Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 16-17; see also Interview with Attorney
10, supra note 39, at 15 ("In fact in this circuit in particular, which I think arguably keeps
spreading, if you submit an Anders Brief our experience has been, they send it back to you
and tell you to argue the issue, or they will give oral argument on it. You know then they are
very quick to criticize what they perceive to be frivolous appeals, but at the same time they
seem not inclined to accept Anders Briefs.").
146 Interview with Attorney 34, supra note 38, at 11; Interview with Attorney 10, supra
note 39, at 15; see also Interview with Attorney 12, supra note 68, at 14 (discussing the
decision to file an appeal or an Anders brief and explaining that "part of that job is, I believe,
getting your client to understand the course of action that is probably most prudent for
them"); Interview with Attorney 8, supra note 97, at 16 ("When there have been cases where
there is no possible appeal issue, I discuss that with the clients, they generally ask for an
appeal to be done. I haven't had that situation come up. I think part of it... with a lot of the
clients, is communicating with them sufficiently so they understand the situations.").
147 Interview with Attorney 10, supra note 39, at 14-15 ("You may have an issue that you
think is a great issue, and you recognize the court's authorities against you, but you want to
preserve a case, a law changes down the road, or you want to make a rehearing or a certain




frivolousness is "overused" by judges and prosecutors. 48 Their perspective
is different by virtue of their roles. 149 As one attorney put it, if defense
lawyers did not file claims that had only a small chance of winning, "we
would never file anything at all."'150  Another attorney explained,
"prosecutors and judges who are mostly former prosecutors tend to have a
cynical [view] . . . .,151 Not all of the interviewees perceived judges as
harshly narrow on the frivolity question. While one noted that judges were
often apt to find claims without precedent frivolous, she also added, "I
think... some judges have a greater appreciation of the need to make some
arguments to satisfy the client's needs... knowing that you are obliged to
make some arguments that you may not even believe in." 152 Still, most of
the attorneys interviewed seemed prepared to risk a charge of frivolity
rather than submit an Anders brief, even understanding that such a charge
could result in sanction.
15
B. COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CAUSE
Criminal defendants and their attorneys often feel outmatched by the
strength and resources of the state to investigate and prosecute.1 54  The
enormous power differential between the state and the defense consists of
resource imbalances, procedural advantages, and political and
psychological advantages. 155 These inequities lead to further imbalances in
bargaining powerl16--a critical element in the over 94% of convictions are
148 Interview with Attorney 7, supra note 130, at 12.
149 Interview with Attorney 12, supra note 68, at 15 ("I can feel how important every
issue is to that client. How it affects their freedom. [And] I'm not in court as often as most
prosecutors and as often as judges .... ").
150 Interview with Attorney 11, supra note 39, at 4.
151 Interview with Attorney 6, supra note 70, at 24 ("I have been doing defense work for
nine years, and that necessarily means that I have [a] different perspective than prosecutors
do.... [F]or instance, they would think it is frivolous for me to argue that the person who
has dealt drugs on numerous occasions in the past, on this occasion was just in the wrong
place at the wrong time. They would think that is frivolous. I think that is entirely
possible ... ").
152 Interview with Attorney 10, supra note 39, at 17.
153 See Interview with Attorney 24, supra note 43, at 11; Interview with Attorney 25,
supra note 38, at 11 ("Well you can get fined if you raise trouble with arguments.... Not
only have they been fined but they've been disbarred. So that's a big problem."). But see
Interview with Attorney 39, supra note 69, at 20 ("(T]here's no harm in filing a frivolous
brief. I mean, what are they going to do? This is frivolous! We're going to .... No.
They're just going to say, 'This is [a] frivolous' appeal. [D]enied. And at least the client has
had a shot at ... venting some ... he feels that he's at least had a shot at the process ... .
154 Luban, supra note 65, at 1731-44.
155 id.
156 Id. at 1744-48.
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obtained by guilty pleas.157 The power imbalance is likely to be reinforced
by legislators given the political pressures of the "tough on crime" climate.
Similarly, the Supreme Court is not likely to intercede as it has held long
ago that there is no requirement that defendants be placed on the same
footing as the government.
158
One way in which defense attorneys have attempted to address the
power differential is by subscribing to the old adage that there is power in
numbers. Collective action is a promising idea for criminal defendants
who, if acting together, could work to seriously handicap the criminal
justice process. The potential of the collective action strategy is obvious if
one imagines what would happen if all criminal defendants exercised their
rights to a trial by jury. Some have argued that the criminal justice system
would collapse under the tremendous backlog of cases such a strategy
would generate. 159  Most governments simply do not allocate enough
resources-prosecutors, judges, jurors or even courtrooms-to handle a
large trial caseload. Arguably if such a strategy could be implemented,
defendants would be better off as a group. Perhaps prosecutors would have
to dismiss more cases, provide more enticing plea bargains, or do a less
thorough job on each case tried.
So why don't criminal defendants and their lawyers act collectively to
seek jury trials in all cases? Most defendants enter into plea agreements
because they believe that they would be convicted at trial and risk harsher
penalties. If defendants collectively demanded trials, many would likely
enjoy some benefit. However, the first to be tried would pay the cost for
this benefit by receiving higher sentences post-trial than they could have
negotiated pre-trial. The criminal justice system is designed to take
advantage of the self-interested focus of most defendants.
157 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATsTICS-2002, at 416, tbl. 5.17 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001)
(showing that in fiscal year 2000, the most recent year for which figures are available, there
were 68,156 federal convictions and that of those convictions 64,558, or 94.7%, were
obtained by guilty pleas).
158 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (clarifying that the relevant inquiry was not
whether defense resources approximated prosecutorial resources but whether the defendant
had access to the "basic tools" of an effective defense); see also Peter Arenella, Forward:
O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (1996) (describing the resource imbalance
problem between defense and prosecution and demonstrating the problem in reverse in the
O.J. Simpson case); David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 482-83 (1992).
19 See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 935 (1983) (discussing
arguments made by scholars and practitioners that the notion of our criminal justice system
without plea-bargaining is unrealistic).
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Lawyers scrupulously observing their ethical duty to represent each
client zealously would never advise a client to join this sort of collective
action unless the client would clearly be one of the beneficiaries. Cause
lawyers might have a different view. For the criminal defense cause lawyer
who may see the class of criminal defendants generally as the beneficiary of
her work, collective action has great allure. It offers these lawyers an
opportunity to help large numbers of people rather than one individual at a
time.160 The defense lawyers with whom I spoke described two examples
of how collective action was used to affect legal change in ways that went
beyond benefits to their individual clients.
1. Collective Opposition to Appeal Waivers
In September of 1995 the Department of Justice distributed a
memorandum to federal prosecutors recommending that they consider
including waivers of the right to appeal as a standard part of plea
agreements in their districts.161 The government worried that far too many
government resources were being squandered on meritless appeals by
defendants who were merely unhappy with their sentences but had no good
legal claims. 162 On the other hand, defense attorneys worried that criminal
defendants were being pressured to waive an important safeguard when
faced with the threat of exorbitant guideline sentences. As one lawyer
160 See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice,
37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1111 (1990) (explaining that legal services lawyers face the
dilemma of choosing between allegiance to individual clients and large groups of needy
people).
161 Catharine M. Goodwin, The Appeal Waiver Controversy Summary: 1996 Committee
on Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of Appeal and Advisement of the Right To Appeal, 10
FED. SENT'G REP. 212, 212 (1998) ("[T]he Department of Justice sent a memorandum to its
prosecutors in September of 1995 [advising] that appeal waivers [were] legal, and
suggest[ing] that prosecutors 'evaluate whether waivers of sentencing appeal rights and post-
conviction rights would be a useful addition to plea agreements in their districts."'). Many
of the attorneys corroborated their district's attempts to institute appeal waiver policies in the
mid-nineties. See Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 15 (explaining that the
Government "didn't used to ask for appeal waivers up until about 5 years ago, I'd say they
started asking for appeal waivers.... [F]or every plea, they wanted appeal waivers");
Interview with Attorney 11, supra note 39, at 19 (discussing meeting with U.S. Attorneys in
one district to discuss the Government's policy of including appeal waivers in all plea
agreements); id. at 20 (describing a conversation with one prosecutor who admitted to being
evaluated on how often appeal waivers were successfully used).
162 Interview with Attorney 8, supra note 97, at 10 ("That is why the government wants
the waiver, in my mind, because they don't want to do the work."); Interview with Attorney
1, at 7-8 (Feb. 24, 2003) ("I think that [appeal waivers are] a way for [prosecutors] to reduce
their workload" because "they don't want to write the appeals on what they see as frivolous
issues.").
1236 [Vol. 95
THE ETHICS OF CA USE LA WYERING
explained, despite all attempts to prepare clients for what will happen at
sentencing, defendants are put in a terrible position if "something
unexpected comes up... all of a sudden their sentence has jumped [up] by
a third and they don't have any appeal rights.' 63 The bargaining away of
the appeal right might negatively impact the individual defendant who
would like to appeal a sentencing judge's erroneous decision. 64 At worst,
the reduction of appeals on a mass scale could severely handicap the
development of the law generally. In the example provided by one
attorney, he explained:
The law in [this] circuit may be well settled on a particular down [sic] departure,
nevertheless if we don't keep raising it the court is never going to change their mind.
I think [the waiver] doeslimpact on the ability to excel at what we want to accomplish
for advocating purposes.
Another lawyer argued that with the rise in appeal waivers, not as
many issues are being litigated and sometimes it becomes difficult to find
cases on particular issues. 166 To the extent that appellate courts play an
important role in creating the common law of sentencing and regulating
divergent applications of the law, their systematic exclusion from the
criminal justice process is grounds for concern.
In response to these concerns, one strategy employed by some public
defender offices and private criminal attorneys attempted to institute a "no
waiver" policy. The assumption was that if defendants refused plea
agreements containing waivers of the right to appeal, the United States
Attorneys Office would eventually reverse its own policy rather than suffer
the huge backload of cases. A systemic rejection of waivers would only be
successfully implemented if a sufficiently large number of defendants
163 Interview with Attorney 1, supra note 162, at 7.
164 Interview with Attorney 25, supra note 38, at 9 (arguing that one problem with the
waivers is that if "problems arise" at sentencing, "there's really no avenue that's available to
[defendants because] [e]verything's foreclosed"); Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42,
at 5 (explaining that a waiver of appeal could impact a case if "your sentencing judge makes
an incorrect legal decision-a decision that could be aptly incorrect based on the law in
fact"). In addition, "there is an appeal waiver and in that sense it just almost totally
eliminates the defense attorney's ability to advocate. Even in the case of an incorrect
application of law." Id.
165 Interview with Attorney 1, supra note 162, at 8.
166 Interview with Attorney 5, supra note 38, at 18 (arguing that cases involving charges
that carry higher sentences, such as gun charges, tend to be resolved with pleas carrying
appeal waivers and so they tend to produce less sentencing case law than they might
otherwise); see also Interview with Attorney 13, at 16 (June 12, 2003) ("You know, there's
[sic] so many plea waivers and there's [sic] so many pleas, that we're not getting a true
represented sampling in appeals about the great issues. Um, people are just letting them you
know, go down the old appeal waiver river.").
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consistently took this position. Because the decision regarding whether to
accept a plea agreement is the defendant's to make, a "no waiver" policy
essentially means that attorneys would strongly discourage their clients to
accept plea agreements that required a waiver of the right to appeal. This
technicality notwithstanding, most attorneys noted that they had a great deal
of influence over their clients in such matters. 
167
The "no waiver" policy has its risks for the individual defendant and
therefore should create a conflict for attorneys who recommend it only
because of the benefit it creates to other defendants. A defendant who
rejects an attractive plea deal because it requires a waiver of appeal may
end up with a higher sentence after going to trial or pleading with no
agreement. Taking this stance against appeal waivers is particularly
questionable for the defendant who either has no good appeal issues or had
no intention of appealing anyway.
Despite these risks, the lawyers interviewed described the strategies
employed in their jurisdictions to address the appeal waivers. Some
lawyers explained the difficulty of trying to encourage a system wide
rejection of appeal waivers. Attorneys often found that in individual cases,
it was often in the defendant's best interest to take a plea even if it included
a waiver of appeal. Although waivers of appeal were never beneficial to
clients on their own, if they accompany some other benefit-such as the
dismissal of a charge, the elimination of a mandatory minimum or
consecutive sentencing provision-it would be difficult not to recommend
that a client accept it.
168
In one jurisdiction, the attorneys did not adopt a collective approach
but rather treated the appeal waiver as an issue to be negotiated on a case by
case basis. The result of the negotiation depended on the leverage of the
parties in that particular case and their commitment to including or
excluding the waiver.1 69 But because the benefit of the collective approach
is lost in a case by case determination, many of the attorneys explained that
167 Interview with Attorney 4, at 7 (Feb. 24, 2003) (explaining that overall clients tend to
take attorney's advice to reject appeal waivers); see also Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client
Decision-making in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers'
Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1101, 1105 (1996) (explaining that legal services attorneys
had great influence over their clients).
168 Interview with Attorney 8, supra note 97, at 10.
169 Interview with Attorney 13, supra note 166, at 13 ("I have not been very effective in
removing the waivers from pleas that I've negotiated."); Interview with Attorney 9, supra
note 59, at 4 ("I know some prosecutor's [sic] if by force, they will just give up and leave the
client without an appeal waiver. Some prosecutors won't give up at all.").
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they encouraged their clients to plead "straight" without plea agreements 170
or they complained that they did not get much in exchange for waiving
appellate rights.'17
In another jurisdiction, the attorneys there were able to use their
collective power to greatly reduce the use of appellate waivers across the
board in the vast majority of cases.' 72  After the Government began its
concerted effort to include appeal waivers in all plea agreements, a large
number of lawyers in the district resisted them by encouraging their clients
not to sign those plea agreements and to plead "blind" instead.173  The
waivers were included only in the few cases where the defendant received a
significant benefit in return. An example of such a benefit was the
reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor. 74  Interestingly the attorneys in
this particular district believed they were more successful than attorneys in
other districts at fighting the appeal waiver policy.
We don't get a requirement of appeal waivers nearly as often as a lot of districts
because,... well I guess a couple of reasons. We fought them hard from the
beginning and they got tired of fighting us on this. Now our US Attorney's office
170 Interview with Attorney 14, supra note 71, at 15 ("[In] many instances my advice to
my clients, I let them make the decision, is let's go in without a plea agreement."); Interview
with Attorney 11, supra note 39, at 11 ("That's one of my best strategies. I do this all the
time. I plead straight up.").
171 Interview with Attorney 16, at 21 (June 13, 2003) ("I've had a lot of cases where a
prosecutor agrees and I'm not getting anything in the plea agreement that I couldn't
otherwise get by pleading to the indictment."); Interview with Attorney 10, supra note 39, at
12 ("[B]y and large, I haven't gotten much for appeal waivers.").
172 Interview with Attorney 21, supra note 57, at 15 (describing being able to get appeal
waivers removed from plea agreements in 90% of cases).
173 Attorneys used the term "blind plea" to refer to guilty pleas with no plea agreement.
Both parties would argue any sentencing issues to the judge and the judge would impose the
sentence she thought was proper. In such a case, both parties could appeal a sentence they
believed to be erroneous. The blind plea became the primary means of resisting the appeal
waiver. See Interview of Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 15 ("[Flor every plea, they wanted
appeal waivers ... and they wouldn't back down. [W]e just started doing blind pleas."). As
another attorney in that district explained, the appeal waiver soon became an ineffective tool
against experienced lawyers who became known among prosecutors for advising their
clients against them.
[Waivers] don't have any major effect. Historically, first they didn't exist. Then the government
tried to put them into lots of pleadings and then people like myself started doing blind pleas left
and right. Because if the government's offer is worse than what I can do without a plea
agreement why would I take your offer? So the Government... they try to put in plea
waivers.., whenever they can.... But not, I think with somebody like me, if they've got a
reputation that says "Don't bother 'cause he... he doesn't do these."
Interview with Attorney 22, supra note 38, at 11.
174 See Interview with Attorney 21, supra note 57, at 15-16 (describing negotiation of a
plea with an appeal waiver because a felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor).
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backs down pretty quickly. We would say, "We're not agreeing." And they would
basically say, "Okay." It's becoming a little bit harder now with this administration
but we still get less Appeal Waivers than a lot of districts that I've heard of. So it isn't
as major a problem as I think it is for other places. The cases ordinarily that they ask
for an Appeal Waiver in are cases which they at least feel like they've given us a huge
amount of stuff. 
175
Although the attorneys did not describe the response to appeal waivers
as a collective action or coordinated policy, 176 every attorney I spoke to in
that district dealt with appeal waivers in the same way. The consequence
was that the prosecutor's office also developed a categorical rather than
case-by-case approach to the appeal waiver--demanding it in only cases
where they believed defendants were enjoying a substantial benefit.
77
2. Collective Action to Expand Miranda
The attorneys in one of the public defenders' offices provided another
interesting example of the use of collective action. They explained that
there was a sizeable and growing number of Spanish-speaking defendants
in the district.1 78 Perhaps in response to the changing demographics, most
federal law enforcement agencies were regularly providing the Miranda
warnings to arrestees who did not speak English. But the Latino defendants
who spoke some English but were still more comfortable with Spanish were
not being offered the Spanish-version Miranda warnings. The defense
lawyers were receiving complaints from these defendants who argued that
they might have responded differently had they received the warnings in
Spanish.
Unfortunately the law on this issue was not favorable to the defendants
who have a functional command of the English. The Miranda waiver must
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.179 Although the Government has the
burden of proving the propriety of the waiver, the standard is quite broad.
175 Interview with Attorney 28, supra note 50, at 7.
176 See Interview with Attorney 21, supra note 57, at 16 (explaining that there was no
office policy regarding appeal waivers).
177 Interview with Attorney 39, supra note 69, at 6 ("I'm not just going to sign the plea
agreement with that [waiver] paragraph in there unless you tell me something that you're
giving. You know, like downward departure, agreeing to an out of the way departure.");
Interview with Attorney 37, supra note 48, at 19 (stating "I've never waived an appeal that I
didn't want to waive, I've either gotten something major in return or haven't waived it");
Interview with Attorney 28, supra note 50, at 7.
178 Indeed one of the fastest growing demographics groups in federal prisons has been
the Latino population. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 158 at 512, tbl. 6.47 (showing
that the Hispanic population in federal prison has increased from 25.7% in 1995 to 31.9% in
2002, whereas the white population in federal prisons has declined over that same period).
179 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation reveals that it was "made with full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it".180 Under this totality of the circumstances test, it is
unlikely that a court would exclude a statement made by someone
marginally proficient in English simply because she would have been more
protected had the warnings been given in her native Spanish.' 81
Although these lawyers had very little hope of changing "the law on
the books," they devised a strategy to change "the law on the streets." The
lawyers in both public defenders' offices I visited had weekly meeting
during which they discussed new cases, reported recent victories and
strategies and shared concerns. 182 In one such meeting, some of the lawyers
discussed a plan to address the problem of Miranda warnings for Spanish-
speaking defendants. The proposal required every attorney who had a case
with Spanish-speaking or bilingual defendants to aggressively question the
arresting officer on the stand (during preliminary hearings and suppression
hearing) about her failure to read the Miranda rights in Spanish. The idea
was that over time, these officers would begin perceive the failure to
provide the rights in Spanish as a weakness in the case that defendants
could potentially exploit. This tactic could be employed in most cases with
Spanish-speakers, whether or not the defendant claimed she did not
understand the warnings, whether or not there was a suppressible statement
involved, and whether or not the case was eventually likely to be resolved
180 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
181 Several courts have found a perfunctory understanding of the Miranda warnings
sufficient to support a knowing and intelligent waiver. See United States v. Bustillos-
Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 517 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that despite defendant's claims to the
contrary he understood enough English to render his Miranda waiver knowing and
intelligent); United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that despite imperfections of language translation, defendant understands the "essence" of
Miranda warnings); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding
that errors in translated Miranda warning did not render warning constitutionally insufficient
where defendant understood essence of rights); United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F.2d
1572, 1574 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (holding that waiver is proper if defendant understands that he
does not need to speak to police and that any statement he makes may be used against him);
Perri v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
Miranda warning administered in Italian by police officer with no formal training in Italian
in dialect different from defendant's sufficient to effectuate valid waiver); United States v.
Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding waiver valid where defendant
appeared to understand Miranda warning administered by officer in broken Spanish).
182 I attended at least one of these meetings in both of the public defender offices I
visited. It was during one of these meetings that I first heard this particular strategy
discussed. For further descriptions of these meetings, see Etienne, supra note 15, at 442-43.
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by plea. The strategy was viewed as a harmless one even though the
defendants in the cases in which it was used would not receive a benefit.
I attended an office meeting during which some of the lawyers were
reporting on the success of this strategy. According to the lawyers, it was
remarkably successful, at least among some of the federal agencies. One
lawyer explained that it was now the unofficial policy of the U.S. Customs
agents to read the Miranda warnings in Spanish for its many Spanish-
speaking arrestees. Because many of the Customs officials spoke Spanish
to the many Spanish-only speaking detainees, this was not difficult for the
agents to adapt. What was interesting was that even those Customs officers
who did not speak Spanish were now carrying wallet-sized cards with a
Spanish translation of the Miranda warnings. The change among some of
the larger agencies in the district, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigations and the Drug Enforcement Agency, was not as significant,
but the lawyers noticed that some of those agents were also starting to
testify during hearings to have read the Miranda rights in the language
spoken by the defendant.
The attorneys happily reported that they had succeeded in changing the
law by "training" the agents to provide Miranda warnings in Spanish.
What pleased them more is that they believed that they had made a small
change in the minds of the prosecutors and judges as well. The more some
agents testified to providing the warnings in Spanish, the more it appeared
that other agents were lacking if they did not do so. The attorneys
triumphantly recounted that it was not uncommon for the prosecutors to ask
the federal agents on direct examination, before the defense had an
opportunity to do so, if the Miranda warnings had been read in Spanish.
The prosecutor would then sit down gloatingly when the agent answered
that she had.
What appeals to the cause lawyer about the use of collective action is
its potential to harness the limited leverage of criminal defendants into a
powerful bargaining entity. However, the limitation of this strategy is that
it puts the individual defendant at risk. It is understandable why lawyers,
including criminal defense lawyers, differ strongly in their views about the
merits of collective action. That said, understanding the attraction of
collection action makes it easier to understand the actions of some attorneys
which might otherwise appear arbitrary and unreasonable.
For example, this discussion of collective action brings us full circle to
the Attorney Tarlow's "policy" of not representing defendants who agree to
assist law enforcement in cases against other suspects. In light of the
discussion on collective action, Tarlow's policy may begin to look different
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to some.1 83  There is little doubt that the government relies heavily on
snitches, informants and cooperating defendants to investigate and
prosecute cases. Although it is difficult to obtain figures regarding the
number of cases that are founded on information provided through
cooperation, it is safe to say that it is probably a significant percentage. Of
all federal sentences imposed, almost 20% are reduced based on
government-initiated substantial assistance departures. 184  Downward
departures requested by the prosecutor, generally for substantial assistance,
constitute over 80% of all downward departures. 185  If all defendants
stopped cooperating with authorities, this collective action would greatly
hamper law enforcement efforts. While this could be arguably disastrous
for the general public in terms of crime reduction, criminal defendants
might be better off as a whole if they collectively adopted Tarlow's advice.
C. TO RAISE OR NOT TO RAISE AN ISSUE?: MANAGING CASES AND
CREDIBILITY
Perhaps one of the best known forms of cause lawyering involves the
impact litigation model of lawyering. Impact litigation lawyers seek "to
win cases to establish good precedent for future cases."' 86 They select their
clients carefully to pursue only those that are likely to advance the law in
the direction they want it to go. 187 Like many cause lawyers who engage in
impact litigation,188 criminal defense attorneys oftentimes have particular
issues or areas of the law in which they seek legal reform. The problem
faced by these lawyers, particularly the public defenders, is that unlike most
183 It is worth noting here that I have no knowledge as to whether Tarlow's policy is part
of some collective action strategy or an individual strategy.
184 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1991-2003 DATAFILES USSCFY91-USSCFY03, at fig. G
(showing that from 1991 to 2003, the percentage of all defendants receiving downward
departures for substantial assistance hovered just below 20 percent).
185 Frank 0. Bowman, III, When Sentences Don't Make Sense, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,
2003, at A27.
186 Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering For Social Change: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 201, 220 (1999).
187 Id. (citing JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY
OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change:
Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976)) (providing a detailed
history on legal reform and cause lawyering).
188 See Kirsten Edwards, Found! The Lost Lawyer, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 63-64
(2001) (defming impact litigation as litigation involving social reform and affecting a broad
group of people beyond the immediate parties); Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based
Violence As Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and the Truly Local, "42 B.C.
L. REv. 1081, 1130 n.268 (2001) (defining impact litigation as litigation involving systemic
relief to large numbers of people).
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impact litigation lawyers, they do not handpick their clients. 8 9 In order to
pursue impact litigation strategies, these lawyers tend to watch their dockets
and wait for the right case to come along in which to raise a particular issue.
This form of impact litigation can be fraught with interesting conflicts.
Cause lawyers may not often have direct conflicts of interest between
their clients' goals and their own causes because they choose their clients
(or the class of clients) in order to avoid such conflicts. An indirect conflict
of interest more commonly arises when the interests of one client are not
fully compatible with the interests of other future clients who otherwise
(and perhaps better) embody the lawyer's cause. This generally means that
lawyers have to prioritize among clients.
The need to prioritize among clients is common among criminal
defense lawyers, particularly those with limited resources. Professor Darryl
K. Brown describes the basis for the triage that often occurs as a result:
Defenders cannot choose to forego a case completely in the way that prosecutors can
choose not to prosecute a crime, but they can come close. More to the point, they
must, and commonly do, vary their level of representation among cases toward two
ends (the second mandated by the first): allocating extremely limited defense budgets
and giving priority to some clients in the most important cases.
Lawyers who are limited in time and financial resources face these
prioritizing decisions and must resolve them in an ethical and professional
manner-assuming this is even possible to do. 191  Time and funds are
certainly precious resources for criminal defense lawyers, and must be
managed accordingly. However, equally critical yet rarely acknowledged
by scholars and practitioners are the strategies lawyers employ in
distributing their best (and worst) legal arguments. This is a prioritizing
dilemma that is aggravated for criminal lawyers who are also cause lawyers.
189 Although this is clearly the case for public defenders it also applies to the many
private attorneys who take appointed cases.
190 Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion to Ration Services and Shortchange
Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIs L.J. 207, 207 (2003) (arguing that "this practice is problematic-
not because it occurs, but because lawyers largely deny it occurs and as a consequence do it
poorly").
191 Brown says that it is and offers a specific suggestion for how attorneys ought to go
about favoring some clients over others. Id. at 214 (arguing that these strategic decisions are
the sort of professional discretion Strickland strongly protects). He recommends several
informal practice guidelines to improve resource allocation. First and foremost, there must
be enough resources for initial case evaluations, in order to better prioritize. Id. at 215.
Then the decision can be made whether to focus on "likely cases of factual innocence" or the
likelihood of success in the defense litigation, apart from any considerations of factual
innocence. Id. Brown recommends giving priority to vindicating actual innocence, and
towards "clients who are likely to gain the greatest benefit from those efforts." Id. This
would mean a focus on parties who face the most severe sanctions. Id.
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Two variations of the need to prioritize arise with criminal cause
lawyers. On the one hand, there is potential for conflict when lawyers try to
determine which cases are the best vehicles for raising particularly
promising claims. This means that they avoid wasting good claims and
arguments on weak cases or cases with unsympathetic facts. A distinct
version of this conflict occurs when lawyers try to avoid wasting time and
credibility on clients with weak cases. Presumably this is because other
cases are more deserving of time or risky arguments that might warrant a
loss of credibility.
Almost every attorney interviewed discussed the importance of
maintaining credibility before the judge. 192 Interestingly, they weighed the
benefit to a particular client of making an argument in her case against the
benefit to future clients. If it was a strong legal argument (but a weak case)
otherwise, some lawyers worried that it would be less persuasive later (in a
more deserving case) to the judge who had already heard and rejected it. If
it was a weak argument, some lawyers worried that they would lose
credibility before the judge and thereby not receiVe the benefit of the doubt
when they argued an issue for another client that presented a close call.'
93
Criminal defense lawyers face this prioritizing daily. One attorney
described the process as spending one's "credibility capital."' 194 They need
to decide what arguments to make for the client, considering the possible
success for the client and the potential effect on the attorney's future
credibility in the courtroom. 195  For example, one attorney noted the
importance of balancing her credibility with the client's demands. 196 If she
makes what she considers to be a borderline frivolous argument to the court
on behalf of one insistent client, it may hurt her chances of winning in the
future.'
97
[U]litimately my credibility is important to me so there are some arguments that I
would [not] make because I feel like there is no chance in hell they are going to win it.
192 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 21, supra note 57, at 20 ("I put a lot of stake in
credibility. I probably put more into it than other people do. I believe that I cannot do good
work for clients in the future unless I can establish credibility with the judges for clients that
I have now.").
193 Interview with Attorney 30, at 14 (Mar. 11, 2003) (talking about the importance of
not stretching an argument to the point that it no longer reconciles with existing law of the
Circuit); Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 8 (discussing the importance of
making legitimate arguments in terms of the effect that it will have on the outcome for a
client).
194 Interview with Attorney 6, supra note 70, at 13.
195 See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 30, supra note 193, at 13.




I am not protecting a right that the client really has or may have in the future and it is
ultimately going to affect my credibility with respect not only to this particular client,
but to other clients that I represent.
19 8
Another attorney characterized this picking and choosing as the
potential for "cr[ying] wolf:" if you present a judge with one too many
arguments that she considers frivolous, when the extraordinary situation
occurs, the judge will not give one the benefit of the doubt. 199 "[I]t also
does more for your credibility... maybe not this client, but for the one
down the road when I can step up and say 'Judge, you know that if I felt my
client really, really needed to go to jail, I would tell you,"' explains yet
another interviewee .200 If this is true, this sort of argument may help the
attorney's present client but not the ones that may "need[] to go to jail."
This suggests that there are significant concerns about the need to preserve
credibility in one case with an eye toward future or other cases.
The decision about what arguments to make in what cases and how
much "credibility capital" each case warranted was more pronounced
among lawyers who worked consistently with the same judges and
prosecutors. Attorneys who were repeat players in the courtroom,
particularly the public defenders interviewed, noted this concern. As one
explained:
But I do think that if you are in a public defenders office or if you're in private
practice when you do um, 95% of your work in a particular court, you are to some
extent, going to think about the next case before you know, call the prosecutor a liar
or the judge an idiot or whatever ....
... [So that you might not take extraordinary steps because you have to think about
the next case. And ... I think it's something that clients perceive as drawback...
public representation or in having an attorney... that works in a particular district all
the time.
In the final analysis, the issue of credibility lies less in the attorney's
concern about how she is perceived by others than in her ultimate concern
198 Id. at 14.
199 Interview with Attorney 33, supra note 40, at 13.
200 Interview with Attorney 38, at 12 (May 13, 2003).
201 Interview with Attorney 19, supra note 79, at 15. This description of the problems
faced by criminal defense lawyers who are repeat players in a bureaucratic system is
consistent with the classic and well-known study by sociologist Abraham Blumberg. See
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 15 (1967) (describing defense attorneys,
judges and prosecutors as cooperative players in the courtroom and how attorney conduct
and advice to clients are influenced in part by the need to satisfy other players).
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for the client and her success in obtaining the best for every client. While
most lawyers evaluate themselves as advocates based on their level of
zealousness, they recognized that they are evaluated by judges based on the
credibility of their arguments. The quandary of how to spend this important
resource of credibility, without detriment to the current client, the future
client, and the attorney's cause, is one with which many criminal defense
attorneys struggle.
IV. THE ETHICS OF CAUSE LAWYERING
A. IS CRIMINAL DEFENSE CAUSE LAWYERING DESIRABLE?
While the categorization of criminal defense lawyers as cause lawyers
has explanatory power, it also raises interesting questions regarding the
interplay of personal politics and lawyering and what it means for the
consumers of criminal legal services. In essence, are criminal defendants
generally enriched or disadvantaged when served by lawyers who are
representing a cause as well as representing their clients? It is not possible
to determine if cause lawyering is better for all criminal defendants in all
circumstances. However, the empirical evidence demonstrates that there
are many instances in which cause lawyering is very valuable to criminal
defendants. Consider the examples provided earlier by the attorneys
themselves.
In the context of the Anders requirement, it may very well be that the
cause lawyer's instinct against the Anders brief is exactly correct. Not only
do attorneys prefer not to file Anders briefs, it appears that judges may
prefer not to receive them. Martha C. Warner, a judge on Florida's Court of
Appeals, wrote that "[a] continuing source of frustration for the appellate
judge is the review of appeals by indigent defendants whose appointed
counsel can find no meritorious issues and files what is known as an Anders
brief., 20 2  Some commentators suggest that judges would rather face a
possibly meritless appeal than an Anders brief.203 Not only does the brief
force the court to spend additional resources to review the record and flag
issues for the attorney that it finds potentially meritorious, but that the
Anders opinion gives courts insufficient guidance on distinguishing
between meritless and wholly frivolous cases. Again, Judge Warner notes
that "the Court's requirements present a logical inconsistency .... If the
appointed attorney can raise 'anything that might arguably support an
202 Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protection is




appeal,' then, as a whole it may be without 'merit,' [but] it would not be
entirely frivolous. 2 °4
If it is difficult for courts to distinguish between meritless, frivolous
and just plain weak, it is even more so for attorneys. Lawyers trying
earnestly to respect the ethical rules on frivolity while being zealous
advocates for their clients have great difficulty predicting what courts really
expect of criminal defense lawyers on appeal. One attorney believed that
the court "frowned on [Anders briefs], chastising us for sloppiness [for
raising weak issues], but when people raised valid issues, which they did all
the time, they found a way to deem them frivolous and throw them
out ... ,,205 Another noted, generally that "the court ... doesn't really like
it because they don't like to take the position [that] the defendant doesn't
have a legal issue either., 20 6 Expressing clear frustration with the Court's
mixed message regarding the Anders brief, one respondent offered:
You know then they are very quick to criticize what they perceive to be frivolous
appeals, but at the same time they seem not inclined to accept Anders Briefs. So one
has to wonder, what is it you think the lawyer should do under these circumstances
knowing a lawyer has an obligation to file a direct appeal at their request to do so by
the client.
20 7
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas addresses this criticism in
Smith v. Robbins, noting that "the Anders procedure appears to adopt
gradations of frivolity and to use two different meanings for the phrase
'arguable issue.' 20 8 Attorneys feel trapped between these gradations when
they are chastised by courts for arguing issues that are too frivolous for
appeal briefs but not sufficiently frivolous for Anders briefs.
Most criminal defense lawyers caught in this predicament rightly err
on the side of full and faithful representation on appeal even if it means
filing a frivolous brief. It is their commitment to the cause of "pushing the
envelope"209 on behalf of disadvantaged clients and against the power of
government that leads to this position. This is precisely what we should
want them to do. In close cases, it seems that cause lawyers are more likely
to err on the side of the defendant and on behalf of the cause. This will
204 Id. at 632 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 746 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
205 Interview with Attorney 3, supra note 89, at 10.
206 See Interview with Attorney 23, supra note 42, at 23.
207 Interview with Attorney 10, supra note 39, at 15.
208 528 U.S. 259, 282 (2000).
209 Interview with Attorney 10, supra note 39, at 15.
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usually involve better representation of their clients than would a strict
loyalty to the rules of the court.21°
Similarly, the lawyers' goals of challenging appeal waivers and the
execution of Miranda warnings are beneficial to defendants and to society.
Without belaboring the point, the arguments in favor of clearer Miranda
warnings for bilingual suspects are the same as those in favor of Miranda
warnings generally. 211  To the extent that improving the prophylactic
benefits are relatively costless for law enforcement (as they were in the case
described by the attorneys), this is a worthwhile improvement for lawyers
to seek. When changing the law on the books seems improbable, cause
lawyers sometimes seek to change the law as it is practiced and executed on
the streets. Collective action proved a useful tool in changing legal policy
regarding Miranda warnings for Spanish-speaking detainees.
Collective action in one jurisdiction was also more effective in
challenging the appeal waiver policy than was individual negotiation in the
other jurisdiction.212 Appeals are critically important to the functioning of
our criminal justice system. The development of a common law of criminal
and sentencing law depends on a sizeable and representative appellate
docket. This is particularly true for a sentencing guideline regime-
whether advisory or mandatory-that is regularly adjusted by the
administrative and legislative bodies to account for the shifting "heartland"
of cases. One danger of the increased use of appeal waivers is that such
waivers deprive Congress and the Sentencing Commission of the
opportunity to monitor the application and development of the guidelines
through appellate review.213  Indeed, one of the prosecution's goals in
encouraging appeal waivers is the reduction of the number and type of cases
that are heard by appellate courts in an attempt to reduce the prosecution's
210 On this topic, Judge Warner writes:
If the ultimate fairness of the proceeding is determined by the effectiveness of counsel in
representing the defendant, then the goal should be to compel full representation through appeal
and not to allow ways for that representation to be avoided. Thus, those states that refuse to
allow withdrawal of counsel on the ground that the appeal is frivolous more effectively provide
the right than do those who allow counsel to withdraw.
Warner, supra note 202, at 662.
211 Miranda warnings provide constitutional safeguards against violations of the right
against self-incrimination while in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42
(1966); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981). The safeguard is
far less effective if the warning is poorly understood or misunderstood.
212 See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
213 Catharine M. Goodwin, The Appeal Waiver Controversy Summary: 1996 Committee
on Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of Appeal and Advisement of the Right To Appeal, 10
FED. SENT'G REP. 212, 212 (1998).
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caseload.214 The federal sentencing system for instance is based on the need
to increase uniformity and limit unwarranted sentencing disparity.215
Without appeals-or in the instance that the Government can determine
through its powerful bargaining leverage when appeals can be filed-the
risk of greater disparity increases significantly. Some have argued that the
Department of Justice's policy to seek broad appeal waivers in most.cases
frustrates the Sentencing Reform Act's goal of using appellate review as a
216
means to oversee and contain unwarranted disparity among lower courts.
As it is, only 10% of federal cases are appealed and 90% of those are filed
by the defense.217
Obviously, appeals are valuable to individual defendants for correcting
legal errors at the trial level. But they are also valuable in correcting
constitutional violations when the courts decide a case that leads to a
significant change in the law. The 2005 United States v. Booker21 8 decision
is an excellent example. When the Supreme Court decided in Booker that
the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional, the
expectation was that thousands of defendants who had already been
sentenced would be effected and seek resentencing. Interestingly, most of
the huge number of defendants who had signed waivers of appeal as part of
their plea agreements were unable to have their sentences reconsidered even
though they were sentenced under a regime that was deemed
unconstitutional.2'9  Given the twenty years of guideline sentencing
preceding Booker, it is doubtful that defendants made knowing and
voluntary waivers of their rights to constitutional sentences.
For the cause lawyer, appellate cases are a far more effective venue for
seeking legal change. By their very nature, appellate cases have a greater
impact on all the courts within a jurisdiction. They often receive media
214 See John C. Keeney, Appeal Waiver Controversy Justice Department Memo: Use of
Sentencing Appeal Waivers to Reduce the Number of Sentencing Appeals, 10 FED. SENT'G
REP. 209, 209 (1998) (explaining that these waivers are "helpful in reducing the burden of
appellate and collateral litigation involving sentencing issues").
215 Id.
216 See Douglas A. Berman, Windows into Sentencing Policy and Practice: The
Crack/Cocaine Ratio andAppeal Waivers, 10 FED. SENT'G REP. 179, 181-82 (1998).
217 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbls. 57 & 58 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf.
218 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
219 See United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding validity of
appeal waiver on Booker claims); United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294 (1 1th Cir.
2005) (refusing to consider defendant's claim regarding the unconstitutionality of his pre-
Booker sentence due to an appeal waiver). But see United States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628
(8th Cir. 2005) (reviewing the defendant's sentence for reasonableness despite the existence
of an appeal waiver).
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coverage that extends beyond the precise jurisdiction. Even a loss on
appeal can be a successful way to further publicize an important issue.
Given the significant demerits of appeal waivers for defendants and for
those seeking legal change and development, it is not surprising that
criminal cause lawyers would strategize to eliminate or limit them as a
matter of policy.
Finally, it is worth saying a few words about the criminal lawyers who
adopt an impact litigation approach. They cautiously select certain cases in
which to raise particular issues. The idea that the criminal defendant and
her case may be "merely" a vehicle for social change can be distasteful to
those who insist on a very client-centered approach to lawyering.220 And
yet, our legal system requires that judicial decisions be made only where
there is a case or controversy. 221 Lawyers may not bring advisory cases
before the courts or challenge legal doctrines without a particular client or
case at issue. It is not then surprising that cause lawyers-lawyers whose
goal it is to effect social change through the law-would occasionally view
clients instrumentally. Moreover, the government can lawfully engage in
this sort of selectivity all the time. It can decide to prosecute or not
prosecute solely to make good precedent. It can decide to forgo arguments
in one case (or even dismiss the case altogether) in order to preserve its
credibility and time for other cases that offer greater publicity or provide a
better vehicle with which to make a particular claim. It is no wonder
defense lawyers would like to use similar but more limited version of
selectivity. However, although a strict reading of our ethics laws might
forbid such lawyering, this mode of cause lawyering in the criminal defense
context oftentimes leads to good results for defendants and for the courts.
In addition to the worthwhile goals of criminal defense cause lawyers,
there is another reason why society may be better off sanctioning some
forms of cause lawyering even when they formally conflict with classic
220 A growing trend among scholars has been the encouragement of a "client-centered"
approach to lawyering that focuses on the client's articulated needs and desired outcome and
rejects the traditional view of lawyers as independent actors making professional legal
decisions. Martha F. Davis, Access to Justice: The Transformative Potential of Pro Bono
Work, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 903, 916 (2004); see also DAvrD A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 2-13 (2004) (arguing that client preferences
and not lawyer preferences or lawyers' assumptions about client's preferences ought to guide
the representation); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 501 (1990) (defining and discussing client-centered lawyering
as an approach that places the client's goals at the center of the representation); Lynn
Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065 (2003) (same).
221 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAWS OF FEDERAL COURTS 60 (5th ed. 1994)
(explaining the case or controversy requirement that American courts refrain from deciding
"questions of law in a vacuum, but only such questions as arise in a 'case or controversy').
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norms of professionalism and ethics. Some commentators have argued that
the problem with ineffective and dispassionate criminal defense attorneys is
far more serious than the problem of overzealous or cause-centered
lawyers.222 In the context of concerns about effectiveness and dedication,
criminal cause lawyers are to some extent model criminal lawyers. Many
cause lawyers whose cause is the zealous representation of the
underprivileged 223 or the importance of giving their clients access to
justice 224 take very seriously their role as effective lawyers. They struggle
over what it means to have good values as a lawyer and a citizen.225 The
question over the decision to file an Anders brief illustrates this point.
Among the many reasons lawyers offered for avoiding the Anders brief is
that the appeal gives the lawyer a second chance to do better for clients. As
one lawyer put it, "[w]ell, you know, you're human. And you always want
to look yourself in face say you've done a good job and sometimes it's
difficult to admit you didn't do the job that you should've done. ' 226 This is
a laudable sentiment and not one that ought to be discouraged when so
many criminal defense lawyers are criticized for incompetence and
ineffectiveness.227 This is not to suggest that everything cause lawyers do is
beyond reproach or that they should be exempt from ethical regulation. But
if it is the case that some forms of cause lawyering are socially beneficial
then perhaps the professional and ethical rules-particularly those related to
222 As Luban argues, the world of most criminal defenders is a world in which
no defense at all, rather than an aggressive defense or even desultory defense is the norm; a
world of miniscule acquittal rates; a world where advocacy is rare and defense investigation
virtually nonexistent; a world where lawyers spend minutes, rather than hours, with their clients;
a world in which individualized scrutiny is replaced by the indifferent mass-processing of
interchangeable clients.
Luban, supra note 65, at 1762; see also DAvID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS
IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63-100 (1999) (discussing the extremely poor
quality of most indigent criminal defense representations); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for
the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE
L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994) (arguing that the right to competent counsel remains unattainable
until more "defender organizations are established and properly funded to employ lawyers at
wages and benefits equal to what is spent on the prosecution, to retain expert and
investigative assistance, to assign lawyers to capital cases, to recruit and support local
lawyers, and to supervise the performance of counsel"); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon
Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (detailing how severe underfunding
undermines the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance).
223 See supra Part I.B.
224 See supra Part I.B.
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conflicts of interest-should be sufficiently flexible to account for such
lawyering.
B.THE ETHICS OF CAUSE LAWYERING IN THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
CONTEXT
Despite the desirability of the results sought by the cause lawyers
interviewed, a strict reading of the ethics rules would deem their lawyering
strategies improper. Lawyers have long been considered to have a strict
duty of loyalty or fidelity to their clients that requires "exclusive devotion"
to the client's interest.228 Model Rule 1.7 describes two types of situations
in which a lawyer may not engage in a representation due to conflict. A
lawyer has a conflict under Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) if "the representation of
one client will be directly adverse to another client., 229 In addition, under
Model Rule 1.7(a)(2), a conflict also exists if "there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyers responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or
by a personal interest of the lawyer., 230 The ALI's Third Restatement has a
similar provision. 231 Most lawyers are very cautious not to handle cases in
which the representation of one client is directly adverse to that of other
clients. The problem for the cause lawyer is that there are a number of
instances in which one client's representation may become materially
limited by concerns for the class of clients generally and the moral and
political cause of the attorney. Cause lawyering, in many of its forms,
seems to directly violate the rules against "material limitation" conflicts of
interest.
"Material limitation" conflicts are more subtle and less obvious than
"directly adverse" conflicts. The interests at issue in situations that may
lead to material limitations do not have to directly oppose the client's goals.
A material limitation conflict exists "if there is some pull on the lawyer's
judgment" or something about the situation that causes a reasonable
attorney to pause and question its propriety.232 Nor must the lawyer
actually behave in a manner or make a decision that negatively impacts the
228 Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (D. Me. 1824) (No. 17733).
229 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2003).
230 Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
23 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000) ("A conflict
of interest is involved if there is substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client
would be materially or adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's
duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person.").




client. The risk of the adverse consequence is sufficient to create a conflict
because ethical rules tend to be prophylactic in nature.
Material limitation conflicts are a helpful way to understand the cause
lawyer's predicament precisely because they focus on the lawyer's
incentives and motivations to act.233 As discussed in Part II, cause lawyers
are often motivated by political and moral goals that are collateral to the
goals of the client. The cause is generally one that is consistent with the
defendant's interest but may still impact the attorney's judgment in such a
way that her decisions experience the pull of her other commitments.
Among the examples offered by the lawyers interviewed, the collective
action strategy regarding the execution of Miranda warnings for bilingual
detainees seems the least objectionable from a conflict of interest
standpoint. Yet even this scenario may materially limit the attorney's
representation. The lawyer's decision to question officers about the reading
of Miranda warnings in a case where the warnings raise no legal concerns
will probably not be directly adverse to the client's interest. While this
tactic may pose no risk in some cases, in other cases a lawyer who was
thinking only of her client's interests might decide not to raise that issue for
a variety of reasons. But time and good-will are limited resources in
criminal courtrooms. Raising this issue may be time consuming; it may
distract from relevant issues; it may annoy the judge and prosecutor; .it may
anger the officer who might otherwise have provided helpful testimony. If
nothing else, using a predetermined blanket strategy in every case seems to
deprive the defendant of individualized treatment and representation. It
certainly does not consist of the "exclusive devotion" underlying the
principle of loyalty in the attorney-client relationship.234
The same argument can be made of the other use of the collective
action strategy described by some of the attorneys to challenge the
government's policy of appeal waivers. The conflict involved here
potentially involves adverse impact as well as material limitation. The
lawyers explained that in plea agreements where defendants were receiving
something substantial in exchange for their waiver of appellate rights--or
to put it another way, in cases where declining the plea agreement would
have an adverse impact on the client-they would recommend the plea deal.
Yet this caution hardly seems to eliminate the "pull" on the attorney's
judgment that emanates from the collective agreement with other colleagues
on behalf of their clients.
233 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 395 (2005).
234 Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (D. Me. 1824) (No. 17733).
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The dilemma regarding the Anders brief also raises a distinct ethical
concern. First, to the extent that a case has no merit and an attorney
knowingly files a standard brief raising claims as though they were
legitimate, the attorney violates the rules against making frivolous
arguments.235 As officers of the court permitted to practice under a state-
issued license, attorneys have duties of professionalism they are bound to
respect.
The decision to ignore the rules established by the Court in Anders and
enacted into most court rules, attorneys who purposefully ignore Anders
engage in a form of civil disobedience. The attorneys who avoid Anders
briefs do so for two significant reasons: they want to give their clients "their
day in court" at the appellate level and they worry that the time-consuming
nature of the Anders brief will harm other clients. Again this becomes an
issue of triage between clients that could otherwise cause material
limitations in representation.
The problem of "materially limited" conflicts is sometimes described
as one of lawyers "pulling [] punches" or "soft-pedaling" the
representation.236 In a sense, this is precisely what is at issue when criminal
defense lawyers use the impact litigation strategy of seeking test cases in
which to raise to particular issues or when they decline to raise issues in
certain cases so as to reserve their credibility for more deserving cases.
Cause lawyers may engage in such practices not to deprive current clients
but to aid future clients. For instance, as one commentator put it, lawyers
become more effective representatives of future clients if they are willing to
provide less than fully zealous advocacy for current clients.237 Attorneys
may attempt justify these practices on numerous grounds. First, there may
be no direct adverse impact if the cases are such that they would not prevail
anyway. Nor, one could argue, would there be a Sixth Amendment
violation if the attorney can argue that the decision to raise or not raise an
issue was a strategic one.238 Indeed, one could argue that this is not a
235 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating that "a lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous").
236 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 232, at 395.
237 W. Bradley Wendel, Book Review: The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (2003).
238 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (stating that appellate courts
are to be "highly deferential" when reviewing tactical decisions of defense attorneys for
purposes of assessing ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690-93 (1984). The Strickland test used by the Supreme Court in assessing an




problem at all under our rules of ethics and professionalism because a
lawyer is not required to make every argument or raise every claim that the
client wants. Clients may decide the objectives of the representation but
lawyers, using their legal expertise, may decide the means.239 But the
argument that a lawyer's decision to give priority to one client over another
is not an ethical conflict if it amounts to a strategic decisions regarding the
means of representation is not ultimately persuasive. Perhaps the lawyer's
tactical decisions would be ethically justified if they were based only on the
best of the interest of the client. But once the attorney begins to weigh the
interests of the clients against the cause or that of other clients, the lawyer's
representation becomes materially limited.
While the ethics rules are necessary to regulate lawyer conduct
generally, they seem woefully out of touch with the realities of cause-
centered criminal defense work. They effectively prohibit many of the
strategies employed by cause lawyers to the extent that some of these
strategies take into account the welfare of other criminal defendants-
whether they are other clients or similarly situated third parties. The
options permitted by the ethical rules in such situations-withdrawing from
the conflicted representation or proceeding with the informed consent of the
client-leave much to be desired in the context of indigent criminal
defense. The high caseloads and limited resources of many criminal
defense lawyers make the notion of withdrawal impractical. Defendants
would likely be worse off with fewer qualified attorneys available to do the
work than they would be with the existing conflict. The criminal justice
system would come to a standstill if lawyers regularly withdrew from cases
in which they harbored ulterior motives of social change. In short,
excessive concern about this sort of conflict might unjustly deprive criminal
defendants of competent and zealous representation.
C. NO QUICK FIX: THE IMPRACTICALITY OF WAIVER
The laws of ethics themselves provide a means of resolving conflicts
of interest: knowing and informed consent by a competent client. Although
some conflicts cannot be waived by the client even with informed consent,
the conflicts encountered by criminal defense cause lawyers and their
clients does not formally fall into the realm of non-waivable conflicts. The
ALI's Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers explains that:
239 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer is not bound,
however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a
lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by
which a matter should be pursued.").
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Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former client, a
lawyer may not represent a client if:
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in the same litigation; or
(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to
provide adequate representation to one or more of the clients.
240
Subsections (a) and (b) are obviously not implicated in the types of
conflicts discussed by the attorneys interviewed in this study. The third
subsection is probably not implicated either. The threshold of "adequate
representation" is fairly low. For instance, the Sixth Amendment
constitutional guarantee of "effective assistance" of counsel seems more
demanding than the "adequate assistance" requirement. And yet, the
leading case on ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal context
makes it very difficult for defendants to succeed on such a claim. 241 This is
particularly true if the attorney's conduct is based on a strategic choice
(even an ill-advised one) rather than on incompetence or negligence.242
But although the rules suggest that these conflicts theoretically could
be consented to with full disclosure, consent is impractical and undesirable
in reality. Let us return full-circle to the predicament facing Attorney Barry
Tarlow-who had a policy against representing cooperating informants-
and his then client Jose Orlando Lopez. While we can speculate as to the
240 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §122(2) (2000). The
Model Rules have a corresponding provision. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7
(b)-(b)(3).
241 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (explaining that among other things, a defendant must
show that the lawyer's acts or omissions were "outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance"). Generally, the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Strickland for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that
counsel's performance was seriously deficient and that the deficient performance was so
prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 687. The absence of zealous
advocacy is not presumed sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.
242 See United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 496 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding decision by
defense attorney not to recall inconsistent witness for further questioning "tactical decision"
reflecting reasonable professional judgment that cannot be considered ineffective
assistance); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that tactical
decisions are not ineffective simply because in retrospect better tactics are known to have
been available); United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
"nothing more than a difference of opinion" as to trial tactics does not establish denial of
effective assistance); Gallo v. Kernan, 933 F. Supp. 878, 881-82 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(establishing that defense counsel's decision not to use inconsistent statements to impeach
witness was "tactical," and holding that it is "well settled" that impeachment strategy is a
matter of trial tactics).
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reason for Tarlow's belief in the immorality of snitches, his reasons are
immaterial to the conflict analysis. An ethical conflict exists so long as
Lopez' representation would be materially limited by Tarlow's commitment
to his moral cause. Tarlow's response was to explain the limitation to his
prospective client. The client knowingly agreed to the representation
despite this limitation. But during the course of the representation, when
Lopez realized that he might want to consider the government's offer to
provide evidence in return for a favorable plea agreement, he did not fire
Tarlow or seek new counsel (as the ethical rules would expect) when a
potential conflict becomes an actual conflict.243 Instead, Lopez attempted to
negotiate unsuccessfully on his own. It is unclear if he revealed important
weaknesses in his case, made admissions, or did anything else during these
failed negotiations with prosecutors that had an adverse impact on his case.
What is clear is that waiver is not an effective strategy for criminal
defendants like Lopez. First, it would be nearly impossible to obtain a
knowing and informed waiver. The subtlety of material limitation conflicts
can render them difficult to explain and anticipate. Second, requiring
defendants to forego representation by lawyers who are motivated by
political or social causes would greatly limit the availability of many highly
regarded lawyers. Apparently, one of the reasons Lopez insisted on hiring
Tarlow despite the limitation was that Tarlow had an excellent reputation
for being a dogged criminal defense attorney who got good results. Third,
those defendants who accept the representation and then change their minds
may experience greater difficulty in changing attorneys than do clients in
other contexts. Not only do criminal cases move more rapidly than civil
cases generally, but the majority of criminal defendants are of moderate
means and have limited resources. The Tarlow/Lopez scenario warns us
that it would be folly to rely on client waivers to solve the ethical problem
of diverging interests that arises from cause lawyering.
A detailed solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper
and must be left to another day. One possibility would be to amend the
ethics rules so as to provide an exemption for criminal defense lawyers.
This would not be the first argument in favor of exempting criminal defense
attorneys from specific ethics norms.2 44 Another possibility would be to
243 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121 cmt. e, 122
cmt. f (explaining that a conflict that was not initially apparent or a conflict for which
consent is later revoked usually requires the withdrawal and replacement of counsel).
244 Professor William Simon describes a trend among scholars arguing for a relaxation of
certain ethical rules for criminal defense lawyers. See William H. Simon, The Ethics of
Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703 (1993) (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-66 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
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more effectively prohibit criminal defense cause lawyering, or at least
certain forms of it. A cost-benefit analysis would need to be undertaken in
which the benefits of having committed and competent defense attorneys
should be seriously weighed against the drawbacks of these ethical
concerns. Besides, my own experience and the interviews from this study
suggest that the cause-based mentality may be pervasive in criminal
defending and difficult to eradicate. A third possibility is to continue with
the status quo, while increasing ethics training among lawyers to help them
better identify possible conflicts and educate their clients about them. None
of these possible solutions are perfect or easy. The principal goal of this
paper is to expose the ethical tensions that exist in a growing, and often
socially-beneficial, trend among lawyers to use the law as a means of
societal change. Only then can we engage in an honest dialogue about good
cause lawyering versus bad cause lawyering.245 The practice of law, even
when motivated by good intentions and causes, must still be subject to
ethical standards. But those standards must be informed by honest dialogue
regarding the realities of cause lawyering if they are to be accepted by the
attorneys and courts that must implement them.
CONCLUSION
My own impression from years as a public defender was that most
criminal defense lawyers are as motivated by political and moral beliefs
about injustice or the need for legal reform in the criminal process as they
are by the particular interests of their clients. Criminal defense attorneys
tend to feel strongly about the work they do, tend to share a worldview
about the prevalence of injustice, perceive themselves as fighting for a
"cause." While these causes may contribute to positive social change in the
criminal law context, they are not without costs. This paper explores the
causes that motivate criminal defense lawyers to do what they do and some
of the ethical costs of their cause-centered lawyering.
In considering the motives that animate the criminal defense agenda, I
rely on the well-developed literature on cause lawyering along with data
from a qualitative study involving interviews of forty criminal defense
Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 605 (1985); Richard Wasserstron, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975)).
245 Manuel Berrdlez et al., Note, Disappearing Dilemmas: Judicial Construction Of
Ethical Choice As Strategic Behavior In The Criminal Defense Context, 23 YALE L. & PoL'Y
REv. 225, 226 (2005) (arguing that greater intellectual honesty in the treatment of ethical
issues in the criminal defense context will help judges and practitioners to distinguish
between "strategic choices that genuinely represent bad lawyering and those choices that




attorneys. The respondents were questioned about the factors that influence
their advocacy practices, the motivations for their advocacy decisions, and
what they perceived to be the goals of their jobs. Even within this small
sample, there is much evidence to support that many of them are in fact
engaged in cause-lawyering as that term is defined in the extant literature.
Their motives ranged from ideological to experiential to personality-based
and their strategies focused on changing the law and its impact on people
like their clients. Their orientations invoked themes that permeate the
practice of criminal defending. They also help shed light on the
motivations of attorneys who enter and remain in other cause lawyering
practices.
It's my hope that understanding criminal defense lawyers as cause
lawyers-albeit an unusual breed-could help shed light on the particular
aspects of the cause lawyering enterprise. In this Article, I take a first step
in this direction by exploring some of the ethical conflicts encountered by
criminal defense lawyers qua cause lawyers. Criminal defense attorneys
who are committed to improving the lot of criminal defendants as a group
and the laws that govern them, occasionally face situations in which their
individual client's interests are not fully compatible. While the client's
needs may not be directly adverse to the lawyer's other goals, these
situations involve more subtle conflicts labeled by the ethics rules as
leading to "materially limited" representation by the lawyer. The ethics
rules generally permit the client to waive such conflicts once they have been
informed by the attorney, I argue that waiver in these instances is highly
impractical. While a solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this
paper, it appears that a more flexible approach to the rules of ethics is
needed in the context of criminal cause lawyering if this type of lawyering
is deemed valuable.
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